“United Press”36 pages
- p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8
LONDON
The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada
Copyright 1948 by…
- p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary
judgment of the importance of this…
- p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani-
zation and, by default, leadership…
- p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing
for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
- p. 61 …It held that
there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
- p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures,
and Howell’s group…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States
and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
- p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could
be concentrated on either coast…
- p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval
air units, while the army attempted to…
- p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train-
ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
- p. 164 …A m y air units in the
Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
- p. 176 …no military alliances
were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans
only…
- p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy
bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
- p. 285 …From 1938 the United
States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
- p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and
lmmediate Deployment
On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
- p. 289 …ground units sent
in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major
invasion of…
- p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States.
Capture of…
- p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them-
selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
- p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart-
ment again pressed for an answer…
- p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle
East Air Force and later as…
- p. 430 …Attempts had been
made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United
States, but…
- p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no
opportunity to get set. The…
- p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters
already included many representatives of the…
- p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the
Netherlands East Indies, he was…
- p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved
that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed
trucks…
- p. 563 …Grady arrived from the
United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with
reference to…
- p. 564 …TO C H I N A
graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to
make high…
- p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became
almost a t once…
- p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate
offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily
against…
- p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air
units initially based there were to…
- p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United
Kingdom several months…
- p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with
its own under a plan eventually…
- p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was
(Patrick, United States in the Air, pp.
190-91.)
38. Charges of…
- p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941.
9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a.
92…
- p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45
Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
mately have been overwhelmed. They believed that a strong British
offensive against vital German objectives was the real answer to what-
ever renewal of the attack the Germans might plan. Only in this wav
could the enemy be placed on the defensive and forced to divert to
defensive purposes, as in the manufacture of fighters at the cost
of bombers, the resources that would otherwise be used to punish
Britain. England, driven from the continent and deprived of allies,
could reach her enemy only by the air.
For some months Bomber Command was obliged to aid Coastal
Command and to use most of its slim resources in attacking the so-
called invasion ports. But plans for a systematic and growing offensive
against German targets were at the same time carried forward. Ex-
cellent bombers had been developed with an emphasis on range and
bomb load; during the year following the Battle of Britain, the first-
line strength of the bombing force would be increased by 50 per cent
while the equivalent increase in bomb load would be 2 5 0 per
T h e scale of the bombing effort, now directed chiefly against the
industrial Ruhr, remained relatively small in the fall of 1941, but
British officials anticipated a monthly production rate of 5 0 0 heavy
bombers by 1943 and looked forward to mounting ultimately an
offensive a t least fifty times greater than the existing scale of effort.42
O n America’s entry into the war the AAF, with its own emphasis
on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is true that there were differences which distinguished
the two forces: British experience had led to a preference for night
and area bombing rather than the daylight, precision bombardment
emphasized by the AAF. But these were differences of tactics rather
than of strategy, of method and not of principle. Indeed, the differing
methods favored were potentially complementary rather than irrec-
oncilable.
I 0 0