Documents / Document
This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
A I R W A R , 1939-41 German aircraft production; the German High Command, apparently still convinced that the hostilities could be concluded in short order, seemed to feel that no great expansion in the Luftwaffe was necessary. T h e operations in eastern Europe, the Alediterranean, and North Africa necessitated the use of so large a proportion of German air strength that air attacks against England and against British shipping in the west dwindled almost to the point of cessation. During the last six months of 1941 no night attack against Britain exceeded 1 5 per cent of the maximum scale of effort made during the autumn of 1940. T h e Luftwaffe was assuming a defensive attitude in the west. Hitler was said to have promised Luftwaffe leaders that the air offensive against Britain might be resumed after the defeat of But the opportunity had come and gone in 1940, and the future held for the Luftwaffe in the west only a defensive mission. Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis- persed as were those of the Luftwaffe. T h e RAF had heavy com- mitments in North Africa, where it was joined by units of the Royal Australian Air Force and of the South African Air Force, and there were defensive responsibilities in the Mediterranean and in the Far East as well as in the home islands and over the submarine-infested waters about Britain, These commitments, however, did not prevent British air chiefs from developing a central strategic focus in their war plans. Tactical employment of air power was one method of aerial warfare, and a very necessary one, but the core of R A F thinking was expressed in the simple statement that the “bomb is the primary weapon of air power; the bomber is the chief means of conveying it to its target; an air striking force composed of bombers is the chief means by which a nation wields its air power.” 4 0 T h e aggressive cast of R A F thinking had not led to neglect of the air defensive, as the performance of Fighter Command revealed in the Battle of Britain. But R A F doctrine stipulated that its defensive aviation should be no larger than was necessary to provide a reasonable defense against air attack. T h e emphasis belonged to the air striking force. Nothing in the Battle of Britain had shaken the strong conviction with which these principles were held by RAF leaders, who saw in the German effort the power of the air weapon even when misused. They knew too how near the Luftwaffe had come to the achievement of its objectives, that had Goering been willing or able to continue the bombardment in spite of tremendous losses, the R A F must ulti- 99
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.