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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
front. Because Hitler was convinced that the Russian campaign would
be concluded within a very short time, he was opposed to the destruc-
tion of Russian factories by bombing, and upon his insistence the
Luftwaffe was used primarily as an extended form of artillery in sup-
port of ground forces. A similar employment of the Soviet Air Force
was made by the defenders, but the opposition by that force was
stronger than the Germans had anticipated and was more impressive
than the performance of Russian air units in the Spanish civil war.
Soviet aviation, organized into a small naval air force and a larger
army air force, had originated during the days prior to World W a r I
and had been strongly influenced during the 1920’sby the germ an^.^'
T h e Soviet government had given considerable attention to the stimu-
lation of popular interest in aviation and to the development of an
aircraft industry, but at the time of the German attack in June 1941
the Soviet Air Force was reported to be inferior to the German Air
Force in standards of aircraft and personnel. Perhaps because of the
nature of the fighting which developed in the summer of 1941,the
Russians employed their air strength almost entirely as a tactical force
in co-operation with ground forces. Production of fighters and short-
range bombers received major emphasis. During the early weeks of
the hostilities, the Soviet Air Force suffered tremendous losses in com-
bat with the Luftwaffe. In addition, the rapid German advance dis-
rupted the air supply and maintenance system and a large part of the
Soviet aircraft industry. But the Russians displayed a remarkable
ability to continue their defense under the most adverse circumstances.
In late 1941 the IL-2, or Stormovik, was put into action along the
front, where it proved to be outstanding in attacks against enemy
ground forces. During the summer and fall of 1941 the Soviet Air
Force was completely reorganized, some assistance began to arrive
from other nations opposed to the Axis, and the regenerated air force,
operating in close co-operation with the Red army, continued to hold
up against all the aerial might which the Germans could throw into
the battle.
In its initial assault against Russia, the German army had been sup-
ported by 3,300 aircraft out of a total strength of approximately 5,900
operational and nonoperational aircraft. In the drive toward Moscow
in the autumn of 1941,the Luftwaffe deployed almost 60 per cent of
its strength along the eastern front, and it suffered extremely heavy
losses. Yet the Russian operations caused no immediate increase in
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.