Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
front. Because Hitler was convinced that the Russian campaign would
be concluded within a very short time, he was opposed to the destruc-
tion of Russian factories by bombing, and upon his insistence the
Luftwaffe was used primarily as an extended form of artillery in sup-
port of ground forces. A similar employment of the Soviet Air Force
was made by the defenders, but the opposition by that force was
stronger than the Germans had anticipated and was more impressive
than the performance of Russian air units in the Spanish civil war.
Soviet aviation, organized into a small naval air force and a larger
army air force, had originated during the days prior to World W a r I
and had been strongly influenced during the 1920’sby the germ an^.^'
T h e Soviet government had given considerable attention to the stimu-
lation of popular interest in aviation and to the development of an
aircraft industry, but at the time of the German attack in June 1941
the Soviet Air Force was reported to be inferior to the German Air
Force in standards of aircraft and personnel. Perhaps because of the
nature of the fighting which developed in the summer of 1941,the
Russians employed their air strength almost entirely as a tactical force
in co-operation with ground forces. Production of fighters and short-
range bombers received major emphasis. During the early weeks of
the hostilities, the Soviet Air Force suffered tremendous losses in com-
bat with the Luftwaffe. In addition, the rapid German advance dis-
rupted the air supply and maintenance system and a large part of the
Soviet aircraft industry. But the Russians displayed a remarkable
ability to continue their defense under the most adverse circumstances.
In late 1941 the IL-2, or Stormovik, was put into action along the
front, where it proved to be outstanding in attacks against enemy
ground forces. During the summer and fall of 1941 the Soviet Air
Force was completely reorganized, some assistance began to arrive
from other nations opposed to the Axis, and the regenerated air force,
operating in close co-operation with the Red army, continued to hold
up against all the aerial might which the Germans could throw into
the battle.
In its initial assault against Russia, the German army had been sup-
ported by 3,300 aircraft out of a total strength of approximately 5,900
operational and nonoperational aircraft. In the drive toward Moscow
in the autumn of 1941,the Luftwaffe deployed almost 60 per cent of
its strength along the eastern front, and it suffered extremely heavy
losses. Yet the Russian operations caused no immediate increase in
98

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.