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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 5 …Imprint N March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the Director of the Bureau of…
  • p. 138 …1939-4I N 28 January 1938 President Roosevelt declared our national defenses inadequate in the face…
  • p. 141 …changed our requirements for defensive aviation,” President Roosevelt strongly urged that $300,- ooo,ooo be appropriated…
  • p. 153 …When President Roosevelt initiated the move toward re- I 16
  • p. 160 …T h e first step was made public on 3 September 1940 when President Roosevelt revealed…
  • p. 165 …These sentiments were expressed by President Roosevelt in a radio address on 3 September: “This Nation…
  • p. 169 …In an address to Congress on 6 January 1941, President Roosevelt suggested the means; 9 5…
  • p. 170 …O n 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt requested the secretaries of W a r and the…
  • p. 171 …The British had prepared, a t the instigation of President Roosevelt, an estimate of munitions requirements…
  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 174 …cent; other nations, 10 per cent.'" President Roosevelt, anxious that as many planes as possible be…
  • p. 185 …President Roosevelt’s request for the report had been motivated wholly by considerations of logistics. But…
  • p. 199 …On 5 July 1941 President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and…
  • p. 220 …and it carried a threat which President Roosevelt described in terms of the greatest danger faced…
  • p. 258 …conflict between Japan and the U.S. Roosevelt attempt curve our independence stop we all know…
  • p. 273 …President Roosevelt specifically directed that reinforcements should be sent there with all speed, and MacArthur was…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …evening, the British party met with President Roosevelt and his military and civilian advisers a t…
  • p. 297 …O n 3 January President Roosevelt sent Mr. Stimson a list of muni- tions, with a…
  • p. 301 …In his address to the Congress on 6 January, President Roosevelt promised that “we shall not…
  • p. 302 …Ultimate decisions on major military policies were taken by President Roosevelt, as Commander in Chief of…
  • p. 304 …Leahy as personal chief of staff to President Roosevelt in place of Admiral Stark.'* It was…
  • p. 322 …given to the nation by Presi- dent Roosevelt in a radio address on 9 D e…
  • p. 331 …At the end of January, President Roosevelt advised the President of Venezuela that, in deference to…
  • p. 332 …During the course of a fireside report to the nation delivered by President Roosevelt on 2…
  • p. 352 …Secretary Stimson reported to President Roosevelt his conviction that the planes from even one carrier could…
  • p. 366 …raised objections which seemed convincing.8 President Roosevelt decided to adopt the more modest proposal of…
  • p. 370 …Elliott Roosevelt during the summer on an aerial survey of the east coast of Greenland in…
  • p. 400 …Elliott Roosevelt and others failed to locate a suitable site for an airdrome.120A satisfactory site…
  • p. 409 …mobilizing the resources of the airlines, President Roosevelt had signed an executive order on 13 December…
  • p. 465 …for effective resistance in the Philippines, President Roosevelt had decided early in February that the general…
  • p. 480 …the basis of a proposal by President Roosevelt: there would be a separate Southwest Pacific Area…
  • p. 499 …Apparently President Roosevelt himself played a role in initiating the expedition, although it is not possible…
  • p. 553 …Lauchlin Currie had gone to China as economic adviser to President Roosevelt for study of her…
  • p. 630 …in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which the Prime…
  • p. 632 …plan was approved in principle by President Roosevelt, and on 8 April General Marshall and Harry…
  • p. 633 …message of 1 7 April, in- formed Roosevelt of his approval of the design; his sole…
  • p. 635 …A fortnight later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were alarmed by a query from Roosevelt as…
  • p. 640 …in Norway-and they understood that President Roosevelt’s anxiety to get U.S. troops into…
  • p. 641 …On 8 July the Prime Minister informed Roosevelt that conditions favorable to SLEDGE- HAMMER would probably…
  • p. 642 …on the ~ 4 t h . ~ ‘Ap- parently Roosevelt gave his tentative approval in a telephone conver…
  • p. 753 …This book shows the close relations between Roosevelt and the Committee T o Defend America by…
  • p. 755 …Address by President Roosevelt at Washington, 27 Oct. 1941, in Peace and War, pp. 767-72…
  • p. 756 …Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 18 Sept. 1941,in WP I-General. I I I . Release of…
  • p. 774 …Memo for Roosevelt from Stim- son, 14 Mar. 1942. 163. lbid. 164. History, Sixth Air Force…
  • p. 776 …Elliott Roosevelt, zIst Recon. Sq. to TAG, 8 Sept. 1941; memo for Col. Olds from Capt…
  • p. 779 …Elliott Roosevelt to TAG, 6 July 1941; Atlantic Bridge, pp. 27-29. 117. Ltr., Sec. of…
  • p. 780 …Elliott Roosevelt to T A G , 3 Aug. 1941 (Report # 3 ) ; ltr., Capt. Elliott Roosevelt to…
  • p. 782 …Memo for S / W from President Roosevelt, 6 May 1942, in ATC 321. 199. On the…
  • p. 790 …Mills to TAG, Mac- Arthur for Roosevelt, 11 Feb. 1942; msg. #5, Australia to Marshall, 2…
  • p. 802 …President Roosevelt had approved the induction as early as 18 December 1941, contingent upon approval of…
  • p. 857 …See also Coolidge; Harding; Roosevelt; Wilson. Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment…
  • p. 858 …Erwin, 330, 339-41, 512 Roosevelt, Capt. Elliott, 3 18, 344 Roosevelt, Pres. F.D., 101…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
factories” were ready to go into production to supplement the exist-
ing aircraft industry. At the moment the British did not possess the
means to carry out a strategic offensive against Germany, but it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German air assault until its own offensive could be inaugurated.
The initial burden of the air war with Germany therefore fell to the
Fighter Command.
During late 1939 and early 1940, German air action against Britain
consisted largely of mine-laying operations to the east of the British
Isles, while the RAF carried pamphlets instead of bombs to Germany.
An air contingent had gone to France with the British Expeditionary
Force, but with the exception of the action at Dunkirk, the per-
formance of the RAF on the continent gave outsiders little suggestion
of its real caliber. Conclusive proof of its technical superiority and
of its staying power awaited the Battle of Britain-a contest fought
wholly in the air and one of the truly decisive battles of history.
By the summer of 1940 the breath-taking advance of German
forces had destroyed all effective resistance in France and seemingly
presented to the Nazis an inviting opportunity to establish beyond
question their control of all western Europe by invasion of an ill-
prepared Britain. In fact, the Germans were less well prepared to
seize the opportunity that lay before them than were the British
to fend off such attacks as came. Though the Luftwaffe urged an im-
mediate invasion, its commanders could not promise security for
supply lines across the English Channel against the Royal Navy. The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment for moving an invading force across
the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required
time for preparation and was reluctant to move without more ade-
quate assurance from naval and air force^.^' Immediate invasion ap-
pearing therefore to be inadvisable, the Germans decided to use the
Luftwaffe as a strategic air force against the British Isles, with the
hope that Britain would surrender or that at least an invasion would
be made less difficult.
Preliminary to the battle, the Germans made sporadic raids during
July and the first week of August 1940 in order to feel out British
defenses.34 The Luftwaffe by this time was equipped with 1,100
fighters and 840 bombers in operational condition, and the German
aircraft industry continued to turn out approximately 500 combat
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.