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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
A I R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
As was the case with military aviation in the United States, how-
ever, the survival and growth of the RAF after 1918 was accom-
plished only with difficulty. In addition to postwar demands for
retrenchment, the Admiralty began to press for control of naval
air units, while the army attempted to regain control of land-based
aviation. But the lessons of World War I as they pertained to avia-
tion were more deeply impressed on the British mind than they were
on the American. Moreover, Britain's geographic position and rela-
tively small population with reference to Germany lent continuing
validity to a doctrine of strategic bombardment which promised a
means of striking at the very heart of the enemy and thus of avoiding
the loss of life which in the first war had well-nigh bled England
white. The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the United States, was hardly conducive to
full military preparedness, and, after the new German menace became
apparent, the RAF was forced to work against a decided disadvan-
tage of time. Fortunately, the emphasis was placed upon quality.
From 1935 forward, the Air Ministry proceeded with the develop-
ment of long-range, heavy bombers-the twin-engine Manchester and
the four-engine Stirling and Lancaster, the latter developed from the
earlier Manchester. For the urgent needs of defense, the Hurricane
and the Spitfire, two superlative fighter planes, were put into pro-
duction after 1936. Production in quantity came slowly, for ade-
quate manufacturing facilities were not immediately available. By
September 1938, the month of Munich, only one squadron in the
RAF had been equipped with Spitfires.
In its pilot and aircrew training, as in its equipment, the RAF de-
manded a high level of a~hievement.~'British air oficials recognized
that the geographic position of the British Isles was at once vulnerable
and potentially threatening to any continental enemy. The situation
demanded not only technical excellence of the air force but also an
organization designed to facilitate the defensive and offensive functions
which a European war would thrust upon the RAF. Accordingly, the
RAF was organized into bomber and fighter commands. T o these
organizations there would be added later a coastal command, charged
with special responsibilities for the protection of shipping."z
By autumn of 1939 the RAF possessed a modest but well-trained
force of airmen. Its bombers, fighters, reconnaissance planes, and fly-
ing boats were few in number but efficient in operation, and "shadow
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.