The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

A I R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
within ten years, and with frequent changes in the chief of staff,
French aviation had little opportunity to develop in accordance with
a definite, long-range program.
Until mid-1934 French army aviation, which like the German was
used chiefly for army co-operation, was under the jurisdiction of the
War Ministry, while naval aviation was controlled by the Ministry
of Marine. In July 1934, the ArmCe de 1’Air (French Air Force)
was established by government decree as “an independent army
capable of participating, on the one hand, in aerial operations and in
the air defense of territory and, on the other hand, in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however, the air force remained closely attached
to the army. T h e reorganization of 1934 did not affect commercial
or naval aviation. T w o years later another reorganization assured the
French Air Force of autonomy, if not complete independence. In
order that command of air units might be separated from command
of territorial units, a decree of September 1936 established a unified
command for all air units other than naval. T h e aircraft industry was
nationalized a t about this time, and a subsequent slump in production
saw the output of military airplanes reduced within less than two
years to the negligible rate of ten planes per month. By this time the
combat efficiency, organization, morale, and equipment of the French
Air Force had dropped to an unprecedented low.
Hurried attempts to rebuild the French Air Force were made after
the Munich conference in 1938. Both local production and foreign
purchases of aircraft were increased, but the revival came too late.
France entered World W a r I1 with an air force which was deficient
in every respect. Besides the low level of morale which characterized
all the French forces, the air force did not have a sufficient number
of bombers for offensive action, and it lacked sufficient fighter
strength for defense against the Germans. Ground troops did not
have adequate air support, while the lack of liaison and reconnais-
sance aircraft constituted a further deficiency. If any thought had
been given to the use of the French Air Force as a strategic weapon,
it had failed to materialize. The weaknesses of the French Air Force
contributed substantially to the success of the Luftwaff e in the spring
of 1940. After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer.
The success of the Luftwaffe up to this point seemed to indicate
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