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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
A I R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 within ten years, and with frequent changes in the chief of staff, French aviation had little opportunity to develop in accordance with a definite, long-range program. Until mid-1934 French army aviation, which like the German was used chiefly for army co-operation, was under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry, while naval aviation was controlled by the Ministry of Marine. In July 1934, the ArmCe de 1’Air (French Air Force) was established by government decree as “an independent army capable of participating, on the one hand, in aerial operations and in the air defense of territory and, on the other hand, in combined operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French military traditions, however, the air force remained closely attached to the army. T h e reorganization of 1934 did not affect commercial or naval aviation. T w o years later another reorganization assured the French Air Force of autonomy, if not complete independence. In order that command of air units might be separated from command of territorial units, a decree of September 1936 established a unified command for all air units other than naval. T h e aircraft industry was nationalized a t about this time, and a subsequent slump in production saw the output of military airplanes reduced within less than two years to the negligible rate of ten planes per month. By this time the combat efficiency, organization, morale, and equipment of the French Air Force had dropped to an unprecedented low. Hurried attempts to rebuild the French Air Force were made after the Munich conference in 1938. Both local production and foreign purchases of aircraft were increased, but the revival came too late. France entered World W a r I1 with an air force which was deficient in every respect. Besides the low level of morale which characterized all the French forces, the air force did not have a sufficient number of bombers for offensive action, and it lacked sufficient fighter strength for defense against the Germans. Ground troops did not have adequate air support, while the lack of liaison and reconnais- sance aircraft constituted a further deficiency. If any thought had been given to the use of the French Air Force as a strategic weapon, it had failed to materialize. The weaknesses of the French Air Force contributed substantially to the success of the Luftwaff e in the spring of 1940. After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained for the Luftwaffe to conquer. The success of the Luftwaffe up to this point seemed to indicate 91
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