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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
A I R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 highly publicized dive bomber or Stuka. Goering had successfully opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the Luft- waff e held responsibility for coastal patrol, overwater reconnaissance, and other activities in conjunction with naval forces. In the same month that Hitler issued decrees effecting the reorgani- zation of the Luftwaffe, he asserted that the Reich would expand to include ten million Germans beyond her borders. Within one month Austria had become the first victim of Nazi aggression. During their occupation of Austria the Germans used approximately 400 aircraft, more than one-fourth of the number being transport aircraft which brought 2 , 0 0 0 soldiers to Vienna. The Luftwaffe soon absorbed the small Austrian Air Force and was again employed by Hitler in Sep- tember 1938 when some 5 0 0 German aircraft assisted in the invasion of the Sudetenland. A year later the might of the Luftwaffe was released in open warfare. By that time, September 1939, the German Air Force was equipped with approximately 4,000 first-line aircraft, of which some 1,800 were bombers and 1,200 were fighters. Behind it stood an aircraft industry then capable of producing approximately 1,100aircraft a month, but actually producing each month about 500 aircraft of all combat types.28Clearly, it was not anticipated that the venture now about to be launched would involve too heavy a commit- ment. In its internal organization the Luftwaffe seemed to have achieved most of its objectives, and it was ready to prove its worth as a co-ordinate member of the Wehrmacht. On I September 1939 the Lufnvaffe and German army forces inaugurated a lightning-like campaign which saw the virtual annihila- tion of the Polish army within twenty days. The German Air Force, which had 1,000bombers and 1,050 fighters in operational condition, met no effective opposition from the Polish Air Force, which con- sisted of less than 500 planes of all types, most of them obsolescent. The Lufnvaffe was used both to eliminate the air opposition and as an advance striking force for the army. So successful was the Polish campaign that the Germans saw no need for major change. Army commanders felt that the results justified their conception of the air force as a tactical weapon to be used primarily in support of the ground forces, while Luftwaffe chiefs took satisfaction in the per- formance of their fighters and dive bombers. There was no demand for the creation of new types of aircraft or for an increase in aircraft p r o d u c t i ~ n . ~ ~ 89
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