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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Terry”1 page
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 keeping with the theories of Douhet, but official policy regarded the airplane primarily as a tactical weapon for use in support of ground forces. The doctrinal position of army chiefs did not overlook the possible aid to be provided by independent strategic operations, but such efforts definitely came second to air support for the ground forces; and, at a time when plans were being drafted for a quick con- quest and exploitation of neighboring countries, there naturally existed a disposition to frown upon proposals for destruction by strategic bombardment of targets which otherwise might be promptly con- verted into German assets. Indeed, some question remains as to how far the German airmen themselves explored in their thinking the prob- lems and potentialities of strategic bombardment. In any case, their job was first to act as an advance striking force, then to operate in direct support of an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff e hardly proved to be so overwhelming a force as its advance notices indicated, it was without question a tough and skillful enemy.” Following a series of retirements, including that of von Blomberg, Hitler in February 1 9 3 8 assumed direct command of all the German armed forces. Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the army and navy, had direct access to the Fuehrer, while the Defense Ministry and the German Supreme Military Staff became Hitler’s advisers. But this chancre brought no essential alteration in the air force mission.23 Operationally and administratively the Luftwaff e had been organized on a geographical basis, and in February 1 9 3 8 four air fleets were established, each composed of a number of air divisions. Each of these air divisions constituted a balanced force of bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance units and could be shifted from one fleet to another as the occasion required. In administration, supply, and maintenance, the provisions reflected an emphasis on operational m~bility.’~German aircraft were generally satisfactory and some possessed outstanding qualities, but they were mainly fighters, trans- port planes, and bombers suited to the requirements of close support for ground armies.25In the fighter class the Messerschmitt 109 was the main reliance, though a few squadrons had been equipped with the longer-ranged and speedier twin-engine Me- I I 0. There were no four- engine bombers comparable to the American B-17 or the British Stir- ling; German bombers were two-engine mediums, chiefly the Heinkel I I I and the Dornier 17, and to these was added the Junkers 87, the D. 88
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