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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 387 …the route over which the Far East Air Force had received its thirty-five heavy bombers…
  • p. 551 …Formerly commander of the Far East Air Force in the Philip- * See above, pp. 396-97…
  • p. 561 …of an air force, depended upon a line of communications extending across the Indian and At…
  • p. 570 …the American air force would be used in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean area…
  • p. 571 …Accordingly, on 24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations under RAF supervision…
  • p. 577 …involved in estab- lishing and operating an air force in Asia. The report of the Grady…
  • p. 630 …Policy for Disposition of US and British Air Forces.” l6 This memorandum greatly extended the scope…
  • p. 797 …MacArthur argued that now was a pro- pitious moment to rush forces from the Indian and…
  • p. 819 …5 8 - 6 7 Eighth Air Force, I, 326ff.; Achtung Indianer, a history of VIII FC…
  • p. 850 …See also CBI; Air Forces, Tenth AF. 336407 3537 356, 3803 395-96, q857 496 India…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
keeping with the theories of Douhet, but official policy regarded the
airplane primarily as a tactical weapon for use in support of ground
forces. The doctrinal position of army chiefs did not overlook the
possible aid to be provided by independent strategic operations, but
such efforts definitely came second to air support for the ground
forces; and, at a time when plans were being drafted for a quick con-
quest and exploitation of neighboring countries, there naturally existed
a disposition to frown upon proposals for destruction by strategic
bombardment of targets which otherwise might be promptly con-
verted into German assets. Indeed, some question remains as to how
far the German airmen themselves explored in their thinking the prob-
lems and potentialities of strategic bombardment. In any case, their
job was first to act as an advance striking force, then to operate in
direct support of an invading army. For that job they were well
equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff e hardly proved
to be so overwhelming a force as its advance notices indicated, it was
without question a tough and skillful enemy.”
Following a series of retirements, including that of von Blomberg,
Hitler in February 1 9 3 8 assumed direct command of all the German
armed forces. Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the Fuehrer, while the Defense
Ministry and the German Supreme Military Staff became Hitler’s
advisers. But this chancre brought no essential alteration in the air
force mission.23 Operationally and administratively the Luftwaff e
had been organized on a geographical basis, and in February 1 9 3 8
four air fleets were established, each composed of a number of air
divisions. Each of these air divisions constituted a balanced force of
bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance units and could be shifted from
one fleet to another as the occasion required. In administration, supply,
and maintenance, the provisions reflected an emphasis on operational
m~bility.’~German aircraft were generally satisfactory and some
possessed outstanding qualities, but they were mainly fighters, trans-
port planes, and bombers suited to the requirements of close support
for ground armies.25In the fighter class the Messerschmitt 109 was the
main reliance, though a few squadrons had been equipped with the
longer-ranged and speedier twin-engine Me- I I 0. There were no four-
engine bombers comparable to the American B-17 or the British Stir-
ling; German bombers were two-engine mediums, chiefly the Heinkel
I I I and the Dornier 17, and to these was added the Junkers 87, the
D.
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.