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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
keeping with the theories of Douhet, but official policy regarded the
airplane primarily as a tactical weapon for use in support of ground
forces. The doctrinal position of army chiefs did not overlook the
possible aid to be provided by independent strategic operations, but
such efforts definitely came second to air support for the ground
forces; and, at a time when plans were being drafted for a quick con-
quest and exploitation of neighboring countries, there naturally existed
a disposition to frown upon proposals for destruction by strategic
bombardment of targets which otherwise might be promptly con-
verted into German assets. Indeed, some question remains as to how
far the German airmen themselves explored in their thinking the prob-
lems and potentialities of strategic bombardment. In any case, their
job was first to act as an advance striking force, then to operate in
direct support of an invading army. For that job they were well
equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff e hardly proved
to be so overwhelming a force as its advance notices indicated, it was
without question a tough and skillful enemy.”
Following a series of retirements, including that of von Blomberg,
Hitler in February 1 9 3 8 assumed direct command of all the German
armed forces. Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the Fuehrer, while the Defense
Ministry and the German Supreme Military Staff became Hitler’s
advisers. But this chancre brought no essential alteration in the air
force mission.23 Operationally and administratively the Luftwaff e
had been organized on a geographical basis, and in February 1 9 3 8
four air fleets were established, each composed of a number of air
divisions. Each of these air divisions constituted a balanced force of
bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance units and could be shifted from
one fleet to another as the occasion required. In administration, supply,
and maintenance, the provisions reflected an emphasis on operational
m~bility.’~German aircraft were generally satisfactory and some
possessed outstanding qualities, but they were mainly fighters, trans-
port planes, and bombers suited to the requirements of close support
for ground armies.25In the fighter class the Messerschmitt 109 was the
main reliance, though a few squadrons had been equipped with the
longer-ranged and speedier twin-engine Me- I I 0. There were no four-
engine bombers comparable to the American B-17 or the British Stir-
ling; German bombers were two-engine mediums, chiefly the Heinkel
I I I and the Dornier 17, and to these was added the Junkers 87, the
D.
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