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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
A I R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 panies engaged in automotive, locomotive, and steel construction. And in May 1933 the German Air Ministry was established, Goering assuming the office of Air Minister.“ With the boldness and audacity which characterized the Nazi regime from the outset, Germany soon threw off all pretense concern- ing her rearmament, and it became evident that the German Air Force would have an important role in accomplishing Hider’s plan of terri- torial aggrandizement. In March 1935 the Germans officially an- nounced the formation of the Luftwaffe. Goering, who continued to head the Air Ministry, was made commander in chief of the Luftwaffe with Erhard Milch as his administrative deputy. T h e “new” air force was then composed of approximately 1,000 aircraft and some 20,000 officers and men. Its reserve supply of airmen was of course very con- siderable as a result of the training programs of previous years. T h e decree of 1935, which officially brought the Luftwaffe into existence, stipulated that it was to be a third element of the Wehr- macht, independent of the army and the navy. T h e air force with its commander, Goering, thus came under the jurisdiction of Gen. Wer- ner von Blomberg, Minister of Defense and head of the Wehrmacht. Goering, then reputed to be the second most powerful man in the Nazi regime, did not enjoy taking orders from von Blomberg, and the relations between the two men were far from harmonious. Personal differences, moreover, were reinforced by differing concepts of the place and role of the air force. Goering wished to make his Luftwaffe a completely independent organization, in control of its own supplies, recruiting, communications, and finances. H e wanted to control all activities which were even remotely related to air, and with such power he hoped to direct the aircraft industry and the allocation of personnel to the advantage of the air force. T h e dominant influence within the Wehrmacht, however, naturally tended to be that of the old-line general staff of the German army, which strongly opposed the idea of an absolutely independent air force. Neither the prospect of competition with it for manpower and materiel nor the idea of com- plete dependence upon Luftwaff e commanders for air-ground co-op- eration appealed to the army chiefs. Furthermore, the army remained for a time less an instrument of the Nazi party than was the Luftwaffe, and this fact was reported to be reflected to some extent in the attitude taken on issues raised by the air force. Leaders of the Luftwaffe advocated a powerful strategic air force in 87
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