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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
A I R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
panies engaged in automotive, locomotive, and steel construction. And
in May 1933 the German Air Ministry was established, Goering
assuming the office of Air Minister.“
With the boldness and audacity which characterized the Nazi
regime from the outset, Germany soon threw off all pretense concern-
ing her rearmament, and it became evident that the German Air Force
would have an important role in accomplishing Hider’s plan of terri-
torial aggrandizement. In March 1935 the Germans officially an-
nounced the formation of the Luftwaffe. Goering, who continued to
head the Air Ministry, was made commander in chief of the Luftwaffe
with Erhard Milch as his administrative deputy. T h e “new” air force
was then composed of approximately 1,000 aircraft and some 20,000
officers and men. Its reserve supply of airmen was of course very con-
siderable as a result of the training programs of previous years.
T h e decree of 1935, which officially brought the Luftwaffe into
existence, stipulated that it was to be a third element of the Wehr-
macht, independent of the army and the navy. T h e air force with its
commander, Goering, thus came under the jurisdiction of Gen. Wer-
ner von Blomberg, Minister of Defense and head of the Wehrmacht.
Goering, then reputed to be the second most powerful man in the Nazi
regime, did not enjoy taking orders from von Blomberg, and the
relations between the two men were far from harmonious. Personal
differences, moreover, were reinforced by differing concepts of the
place and role of the air force. Goering wished to make his Luftwaffe
a completely independent organization, in control of its own supplies,
recruiting, communications, and finances. H e wanted to control all
activities which were even remotely related to air, and with such
power he hoped to direct the aircraft industry and the allocation of
personnel to the advantage of the air force. T h e dominant influence
within the Wehrmacht, however, naturally tended to be that of the
old-line general staff of the German army, which strongly opposed the
idea of an absolutely independent air force. Neither the prospect of
competition with it for manpower and materiel nor the idea of com-
plete dependence upon Luftwaff e commanders for air-ground co-op-
eration appealed to the army chiefs. Furthermore, the army remained
for a time less an instrument of the Nazi party than was the Luftwaffe,
and this fact was reported to be reflected to some extent in the attitude
taken on issues raised by the air force.
Leaders of the Luftwaffe advocated a powerful strategic air force in
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.