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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
A I R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
panies engaged in automotive, locomotive, and steel construction. And
in May 1933 the German Air Ministry was established, Goering
assuming the office of Air Minister.“
With the boldness and audacity which characterized the Nazi
regime from the outset, Germany soon threw off all pretense concern-
ing her rearmament, and it became evident that the German Air Force
would have an important role in accomplishing Hider’s plan of terri-
torial aggrandizement. In March 1935 the Germans officially an-
nounced the formation of the Luftwaffe. Goering, who continued to
head the Air Ministry, was made commander in chief of the Luftwaffe
with Erhard Milch as his administrative deputy. T h e “new” air force
was then composed of approximately 1,000 aircraft and some 20,000
officers and men. Its reserve supply of airmen was of course very con-
siderable as a result of the training programs of previous years.
T h e decree of 1935, which officially brought the Luftwaffe into
existence, stipulated that it was to be a third element of the Wehr-
macht, independent of the army and the navy. T h e air force with its
commander, Goering, thus came under the jurisdiction of Gen. Wer-
ner von Blomberg, Minister of Defense and head of the Wehrmacht.
Goering, then reputed to be the second most powerful man in the Nazi
regime, did not enjoy taking orders from von Blomberg, and the
relations between the two men were far from harmonious. Personal
differences, moreover, were reinforced by differing concepts of the
place and role of the air force. Goering wished to make his Luftwaffe
a completely independent organization, in control of its own supplies,
recruiting, communications, and finances. H e wanted to control all
activities which were even remotely related to air, and with such
power he hoped to direct the aircraft industry and the allocation of
personnel to the advantage of the air force. T h e dominant influence
within the Wehrmacht, however, naturally tended to be that of the
old-line general staff of the German army, which strongly opposed the
idea of an absolutely independent air force. Neither the prospect of
competition with it for manpower and materiel nor the idea of com-
plete dependence upon Luftwaff e commanders for air-ground co-op-
eration appealed to the army chiefs. Furthermore, the army remained
for a time less an instrument of the Nazi party than was the Luftwaffe,
and this fact was reported to be reflected to some extent in the attitude
taken on issues raised by the air force.
Leaders of the Luftwaffe advocated a powerful strategic air force in
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