The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
The Italian Air Force
In the theory of aerial warfare and in the organization of their air
forces the Italians were much further advanced than the Japanese.
Following World War I, Italian aviation had sunk to a low level of
efficiency and strength. By 1922 their first-line aircraft, approximately
I 00 in number, were becoming obsolete. But when Mussolini came to
power in that year, he instituted a series of changes designed to build
a powerful air arm. Making the air force independent of the army and
the navy, Mussolini established a separate air ministry with himself as
Air Minister.’ The new office, which had control over the placing of
all orders for aircraft in Italy, encouraged the development of new
models and began to place into production the two most promising
designs offered in any one competition. By 1939 some twenty-nine
firms in Italy were producing aircraft, while six firms were manufac-
turing aircraft engines.lO By this time the Air Ministry had steered the
Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air Force) through a number of reorgani-
zations to meet the expanding demands of Italy’s aggressive policy.
When the country became an active participant in World War 11,
the Regia Aeronautica was organized into four parts: an independent
air force, army co-operation units, a naval air service, and a colonial
air force.”
For their air doctrines, the Italians depended almost entirely on the
thinking of their noted Gen. Giulio Douhet. It was Douhet’s belief
that the airplane had revolutionized the nature of war. As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the offensive, aerial operations were carried out in a medium which
facilitated offensive action. No longer would warfare be confined to
armies on the field of battle or to vessels on the high seas; according to
Douhet, the total population now became the belligerents, and victory
could result only from the total application of a nation’s material and
moral resources and the exhaustion of those resources of the enemy.
He emphasized the necessity for swift and decisive destruction from
the air, the rapidity of the successive attacks not allowing for material
repairs or recovery of morale. This doctrine reflected Italy’s economic
weakness and a vulnerable geographic position; for while her position
in the Mediterranean was potentially dominating, it was also danger-
ously exposed, and her economic resources were decidedly limited.
Italy’s best chance of success in warfare therefore seemed to lie in a
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