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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
A I R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 army air units, the airplane was chiefly a tactical weapon for support- ing ground troops a t short range. While the navy’s concept was broader, it did not encompass the necessity or desirability of long- range, sustained air attacks on rear areas. There was nothing to indi- cate that the Japanese comprehended the logistical possibilities of transport aircraft, either for troop-carrier or for supply-dropping purposes. T h e lack of co-operation between the army and navy forces did not augur well for a war which might demand joint operations. Furthermore, the division of the forces extended into the production realm, where the army and navy competed for production facilities and raw materials and failed to provide for the exchange of informa- tion so vital to the efficiency of the Japanese aircraft industry. Actually, the Japanese possessed neither the economic potential nor the extensive technical skill necessary for developing and maintaining a first-class air force. If other nations erred in underestimating the strength of Japanese air power in 1941, the Japanese high command for its part failed to appreciate the disparity between Japan’s air potential and that of prospective opponents. In 1941,for example, the aircraft industry in Japan turned out only 5,088 planes, while the United States, though only in the initial stages of its conversion to a wartime economy, produced 19,445. In comparison with the I 1,000 pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during 1941, the Japanese training programs turned out about 3,000. T h e Japanese also seemed to have had little appreciation of the problem of replacements, for they sacrificed safety factors in aircraft to performance, and they made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained personnel. In the matter of airfield construction and maintenance of aircraft, the Japanese had only rudimentary conceptions of the prob- lems involved; no system had been developed for the rapid construc- tion of airfields, while only small supplies of spare parts were kept on hand and the number of depots for major repairs was inadequate for extensive operations.8 T h e Japanese air forces were not prepared for a war of long dura- tion. Their major dependence would be placed on the element of sur- prise and on a few well-trained airmen in the execution of skillfully laid plans. Confident of an early victory, they discounted the potential strength of their enemies. 8 1
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