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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
planes were hybrids of foreign designs, with German influence being
particularly noticeable after 1936 when Japan threw in her lot with
Germany by signing the Anti-Comintern Pact.'
By 7 December 1941Japanese air strength consisted of some 2,700
aircraft assigned to fully trained air units. Approximately 6,000 pilots
had been graduated from air schools or training units, 3,500 of which
were assigned to the navy and the remainder to the army. About 50
per cent of the army pilots had been in combat either in China or in
the border fighting against the Soviet Air Force, while 10 per cent of
land-based navy pilots had participated in the Chinese operations.
Some 600 of the best navy pilots were assigned to aircraft carrier units.
In contrast to the 2 0 0 hours in primary, basic, and advanced training
then being given to Air Corps cadets in the United States, the Japanese
pilots were receiving about 300 hours in training units before being
assigned to tactical units. The average first-line Japanese pilot in 1941
had about 600 flying hours, and the average pilot in the carrier groups
which were destined to begin hostilities against the United States had
over 800 hours. Though somewhat discounted by officials of other
nations, the Japanese air forces had now reached a peak of efficiency,
a t any rate in their first-line strength, which gave them a commanding
position in the Pacific.
There were, however, certain fundamental weaknesses. In their
approach to the problems of air warfare, the Japanese took a limited
view of its possibilities. T o the ground force officers who commanded
digits of the year of issue according to the Japanese calendar, by which the year 1940
was the Japanese year 2,600. Thus the planes brought into use during 1939 were
designated as type 9 and those issued in 1940 were type 0. A t first only one type 0
aircraft-the Mitsubishi type 0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to American pilots and called the Zero. When, in the
fall of 1942, the Americans began to meet other type 0 aircraft, however, they gave
up identification by serial numbers in favor of short, easily pronounced code names.
By this nomenclature the more important of Japan's tactical aircraft came to be known
as follows: the Mitsubishi type 0 single-engine fighter (made also by Nakajima)
became the Zeke, its float-plane counterpart the Rufe, the Nakajima type 97 single-
engine army and navy fighter the Nate, and the Nakajima type I single-engine fighter
the Oscar; the type 97 bomber made by both Nakajima and Mitsubishi became the
Kate, the type 99 Aichi dive bomber was called the Val, and the Mitsubishi twin-
engine medium bombers types 96, 97, and I were named the Nell, Sally, and Betty;
the types 97 and 98 Mitsubishi light bombers became the Babs and Sonia; the two
principal four-engine flying boats in use during 1942, the types 97 and z Kawankhi,
were designated as the Mavis and Emily; and the type D-z transport (the Douglas
DC-z adaptation) was named the Tess, while the Mitsubishi type 0 transport became
known as the Topsy.
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