“Roosevelt”53 pages
- p. 5 …Imprint
N March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the
Director of the Bureau of…
- p. 138 …1939-4I
N 28 January 1938 President Roosevelt declared our national
defenses inadequate in the face…
- p. 141 …changed our requirements
for defensive aviation,” President Roosevelt strongly urged that $300,-
ooo,ooo be appropriated…
- p. 153 …When President Roosevelt initiated the move toward re-
I 16
- p. 160 …T h e first step was made public on 3 September 1940 when President
Roosevelt revealed…
- p. 165 …These sentiments were expressed by President Roosevelt in a radio
address on 3 September: “This Nation…
- p. 169 …In an address to Congress on 6 January 1941, President
Roosevelt suggested the means; 9 5…
- p. 170 …O n 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt requested the secretaries of
W a r and the…
- p. 171 …The British had prepared, a t the instigation of President Roosevelt,
an estimate of munitions requirements…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 174 …cent; other
nations, 10 per cent.'"
President Roosevelt, anxious that as many planes as possible be…
- p. 185 …President Roosevelt’s request for the report had been
motivated wholly by considerations of logistics. But…
- p. 199 …On 5 July 1941
President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and…
- p. 220 …and it carried a threat which President Roosevelt
described in terms of the greatest danger faced…
- p. 258 …conflict between Japan and the
U.S. Roosevelt attempt curve our independence stop we all know…
- p. 273 …President Roosevelt specifically directed that reinforcements
should be sent there with all speed, and MacArthur was…
- p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs
of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
- p. 287 …evening, the British
party met with President Roosevelt and his military and civilian
advisers a t…
- p. 297 …O n 3 January President Roosevelt sent Mr. Stimson a list of muni-
tions, with a…
- p. 301 …In his address to
the Congress on 6 January, President Roosevelt promised that “we
shall not…
- p. 302 …Ultimate decisions on major
military policies were taken by President Roosevelt, as Commander
in Chief of…
- p. 304 …Leahy as personal chief of staff to President
Roosevelt in place of Admiral Stark.'* It was…
- p. 322 …given to the nation by Presi-
dent Roosevelt in a radio address on 9 D e…
- p. 331 …At the end of January, President Roosevelt
advised the President of Venezuela that, in deference to…
- p. 332 …During the course of a fireside report to the nation delivered by
President Roosevelt on 2…
- p. 352 …Secretary Stimson
reported to President Roosevelt his conviction that the planes from
even one carrier could…
- p. 366 …raised objections
which seemed convincing.8 President Roosevelt decided to adopt the
more modest proposal of…
- p. 370 …Elliott Roosevelt during the
summer on an aerial survey of the east coast of Greenland in…
- p. 400 …Elliott Roosevelt and others failed
to locate a suitable site for an airdrome.120A satisfactory site…
- p. 409 …mobilizing the resources of the airlines, President
Roosevelt had signed an executive order on 13 December…
- p. 465 …for effective
resistance in the Philippines, President Roosevelt had decided early in
February that the general…
- p. 480 …the basis of a proposal by President Roosevelt: there would
be a separate Southwest Pacific Area…
- p. 499 …Apparently
President Roosevelt himself played a role in initiating the expedition,
although it is not possible…
- p. 553 …Lauchlin Currie had gone to
China as economic adviser to President Roosevelt for study of her…
- p. 630 …in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered
on 5 March, in which the Prime…
- p. 632 …plan was approved in principle by President Roosevelt, and on
8 April General Marshall and Harry…
- p. 633 …message of 1 7 April, in-
formed Roosevelt of his approval of the design; his sole…
- p. 635 …A fortnight later, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff were alarmed by a query from Roosevelt as…
- p. 640 …in Norway-and they understood that President Roosevelt’s
anxiety to get U.S. troops into…
- p. 641 …On 8 July the Prime
Minister informed Roosevelt that conditions favorable to SLEDGE-
HAMMER would probably…
- p. 642 …on the ~ 4 t h . ~ ‘Ap-
parently Roosevelt gave his tentative approval in a telephone conver…
- p. 753 …This book shows the
close relations between Roosevelt and
the Committee T o Defend America by…
- p. 755 …Address by President Roosevelt at
Washington, 27 Oct. 1941, in Peace and
War, pp. 767-72…
- p. 756 …Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 18
Sept. 1941,in WP I-General.
I I I . Release of…
- p. 774 …Memo for Roosevelt from Stim-
son, 14 Mar. 1942.
163. lbid.
164. History, Sixth Air Force…
- p. 776 …Elliott Roosevelt,
zIst Recon. Sq. to TAG, 8 Sept. 1941;
memo for Col. Olds from Capt…
- p. 779 …Elliott
Roosevelt to TAG, 6 July 1941; Atlantic
Bridge, pp. 27-29.
117. Ltr., Sec. of…
- p. 780 …Elliott Roosevelt to T A G , 3 Aug. 1941
(Report # 3 ) ; ltr., Capt. Elliott Roosevelt
to…
- p. 782 …Memo for S / W from President
Roosevelt, 6 May 1942, in ATC 321.
199. On the…
- p. 790 …Mills to TAG, Mac-
Arthur for Roosevelt, 11 Feb. 1942; msg.
#5, Australia to Marshall, 2…
- p. 802 …President Roosevelt had approved
the induction as early as 18 December
1941, contingent upon approval of…
- p. 857 …See also Coolidge;
Harding; Roosevelt; Wilson.
Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45
Press comment…
- p. 858 …Erwin, 330, 339-41, 512
Roosevelt, Capt. Elliott, 3 18, 344
Roosevelt, Pres. F.D., 101…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
planes were hybrids of foreign designs, with German influence being
particularly noticeable after 1936 when Japan threw in her lot with
Germany by signing the Anti-Comintern Pact.'
By 7 December 1941Japanese air strength consisted of some 2,700
aircraft assigned to fully trained air units. Approximately 6,000 pilots
had been graduated from air schools or training units, 3,500 of which
were assigned to the navy and the remainder to the army. About 50
per cent of the army pilots had been in combat either in China or in
the border fighting against the Soviet Air Force, while 10 per cent of
land-based navy pilots had participated in the Chinese operations.
Some 600 of the best navy pilots were assigned to aircraft carrier units.
In contrast to the 2 0 0 hours in primary, basic, and advanced training
then being given to Air Corps cadets in the United States, the Japanese
pilots were receiving about 300 hours in training units before being
assigned to tactical units. The average first-line Japanese pilot in 1941
had about 600 flying hours, and the average pilot in the carrier groups
which were destined to begin hostilities against the United States had
over 800 hours. Though somewhat discounted by officials of other
nations, the Japanese air forces had now reached a peak of efficiency,
a t any rate in their first-line strength, which gave them a commanding
position in the Pacific.
There were, however, certain fundamental weaknesses. In their
approach to the problems of air warfare, the Japanese took a limited
view of its possibilities. T o the ground force officers who commanded
digits of the year of issue according to the Japanese calendar, by which the year 1940
was the Japanese year 2,600. Thus the planes brought into use during 1939 were
designated as type 9 and those issued in 1940 were type 0. A t first only one type 0
aircraft-the Mitsubishi type 0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to American pilots and called the Zero. When, in the
fall of 1942, the Americans began to meet other type 0 aircraft, however, they gave
up identification by serial numbers in favor of short, easily pronounced code names.
By this nomenclature the more important of Japan's tactical aircraft came to be known
as follows: the Mitsubishi type 0 single-engine fighter (made also by Nakajima)
became the Zeke, its float-plane counterpart the Rufe, the Nakajima type 97 single-
engine army and navy fighter the Nate, and the Nakajima type I single-engine fighter
the Oscar; the type 97 bomber made by both Nakajima and Mitsubishi became the
Kate, the type 99 Aichi dive bomber was called the Val, and the Mitsubishi twin-
engine medium bombers types 96, 97, and I were named the Nell, Sally, and Betty;
the types 97 and 98 Mitsubishi light bombers became the Babs and Sonia; the two
principal four-engine flying boats in use during 1942, the types 97 and z Kawankhi,
were designated as the Mavis and Emily; and the type D-z transport (the Douglas
DC-z adaptation) was named the Tess, while the Mitsubishi type 0 transport became
known as the Topsy.
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