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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to “sweep the Germans from the sky…
  • p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with the ambitious idens of air power which…
  • p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was never equipped during…
  • p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are you in the Army or the Corps…
  • p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
  • p. 69 …But one axiom, with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never- theless left an open question as to how…
  • p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300 aircraft a month. The pattern of…
  • p. 122 …the German Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in the…
  • p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French factories, the force had never been employed in a…
  • p. 140 …into a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands of our own forces…
  • p. 150 …Long-term needs of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities never…
  • p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
  • p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
  • p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never- theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
  • p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
  • p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points have never been satisfactorily explained. T h e general pattern…
  • p. 277 …motors, sole- noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit- less search…
  • p. 288 …planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the accepted grand…
  • p. 303 …the principal features of the plan were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
  • p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
  • p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
  • p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
  • p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
  • p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
  • p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
  • p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been accomplished, yet now it…
  • p. 509 …Island, in the Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May the two…
  • p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the aircrews, for on the operational level…
  • p. 524 …handicaps under which AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
  • p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that proper observance of economy of force would never…
  • p. 531 …Crews which had previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these weapons into…
  • p. 544 …But the Japanese never at any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
  • p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into All told, the record…
  • p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com- mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
  • p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
  • p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
  • p. 614 …that reason deserving a high priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
  • p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign- ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
  • p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
  • p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England, nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
  • p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never before equaled by the military forces of two…
  • p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
planes were hybrids of foreign designs, with German influence being
particularly noticeable after 1936 when Japan threw in her lot with
Germany by signing the Anti-Comintern Pact.'
By 7 December 1941Japanese air strength consisted of some 2,700
aircraft assigned to fully trained air units. Approximately 6,000 pilots
had been graduated from air schools or training units, 3,500 of which
were assigned to the navy and the remainder to the army. About 50
per cent of the army pilots had been in combat either in China or in
the border fighting against the Soviet Air Force, while 10 per cent of
land-based navy pilots had participated in the Chinese operations.
Some 600 of the best navy pilots were assigned to aircraft carrier units.
In contrast to the 2 0 0 hours in primary, basic, and advanced training
then being given to Air Corps cadets in the United States, the Japanese
pilots were receiving about 300 hours in training units before being
assigned to tactical units. The average first-line Japanese pilot in 1941
had about 600 flying hours, and the average pilot in the carrier groups
which were destined to begin hostilities against the United States had
over 800 hours. Though somewhat discounted by officials of other
nations, the Japanese air forces had now reached a peak of efficiency,
a t any rate in their first-line strength, which gave them a commanding
position in the Pacific.
There were, however, certain fundamental weaknesses. In their
approach to the problems of air warfare, the Japanese took a limited
view of its possibilities. T o the ground force officers who commanded
digits of the year of issue according to the Japanese calendar, by which the year 1940
was the Japanese year 2,600. Thus the planes brought into use during 1939 were
designated as type 9 and those issued in 1940 were type 0. A t first only one type 0
aircraft-the Mitsubishi type 0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to American pilots and called the Zero. When, in the
fall of 1942, the Americans began to meet other type 0 aircraft, however, they gave
up identification by serial numbers in favor of short, easily pronounced code names.
By this nomenclature the more important of Japan's tactical aircraft came to be known
as follows: the Mitsubishi type 0 single-engine fighter (made also by Nakajima)
became the Zeke, its float-plane counterpart the Rufe, the Nakajima type 97 single-
engine army and navy fighter the Nate, and the Nakajima type I single-engine fighter
the Oscar; the type 97 bomber made by both Nakajima and Mitsubishi became the
Kate, the type 99 Aichi dive bomber was called the Val, and the Mitsubishi twin-
engine medium bombers types 96, 97, and I were named the Nell, Sally, and Betty;
the types 97 and 98 Mitsubishi light bombers became the Babs and Sonia; the two
principal four-engine flying boats in use during 1942, the types 97 and z Kawankhi,
were designated as the Mavis and Emily; and the type D-z transport (the Douglas
DC-z adaptation) was named the Tess, while the Mitsubishi type 0 transport became
known as the Topsy.
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