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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
planes were hybrids of foreign designs, with German influence being
particularly noticeable after 1936 when Japan threw in her lot with
Germany by signing the Anti-Comintern Pact.'
By 7 December 1941Japanese air strength consisted of some 2,700
aircraft assigned to fully trained air units. Approximately 6,000 pilots
had been graduated from air schools or training units, 3,500 of which
were assigned to the navy and the remainder to the army. About 50
per cent of the army pilots had been in combat either in China or in
the border fighting against the Soviet Air Force, while 10 per cent of
land-based navy pilots had participated in the Chinese operations.
Some 600 of the best navy pilots were assigned to aircraft carrier units.
In contrast to the 2 0 0 hours in primary, basic, and advanced training
then being given to Air Corps cadets in the United States, the Japanese
pilots were receiving about 300 hours in training units before being
assigned to tactical units. The average first-line Japanese pilot in 1941
had about 600 flying hours, and the average pilot in the carrier groups
which were destined to begin hostilities against the United States had
over 800 hours. Though somewhat discounted by officials of other
nations, the Japanese air forces had now reached a peak of efficiency,
a t any rate in their first-line strength, which gave them a commanding
position in the Pacific.
There were, however, certain fundamental weaknesses. In their
approach to the problems of air warfare, the Japanese took a limited
view of its possibilities. T o the ground force officers who commanded
digits of the year of issue according to the Japanese calendar, by which the year 1940
was the Japanese year 2,600. Thus the planes brought into use during 1939 were
designated as type 9 and those issued in 1940 were type 0. A t first only one type 0
aircraft-the Mitsubishi type 0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to American pilots and called the Zero. When, in the
fall of 1942, the Americans began to meet other type 0 aircraft, however, they gave
up identification by serial numbers in favor of short, easily pronounced code names.
By this nomenclature the more important of Japan's tactical aircraft came to be known
as follows: the Mitsubishi type 0 single-engine fighter (made also by Nakajima)
became the Zeke, its float-plane counterpart the Rufe, the Nakajima type 97 single-
engine army and navy fighter the Nate, and the Nakajima type I single-engine fighter
the Oscar; the type 97 bomber made by both Nakajima and Mitsubishi became the
Kate, the type 99 Aichi dive bomber was called the Val, and the Mitsubishi twin-
engine medium bombers types 96, 97, and I were named the Nell, Sally, and Betty;
the types 97 and 98 Mitsubishi light bombers became the Babs and Sonia; the two
principal four-engine flying boats in use during 1942, the types 97 and z Kawankhi,
were designated as the Mavis and Emily; and the type D-z transport (the Douglas
DC-z adaptation) was named the Tess, while the Mitsubishi type 0 transport became
known as the Topsy.
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