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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 test in combat. In 193I the Japanese army had moved into Manchuria, and from that stronghold drove into China in the summer of 1937. The air forces of the aggressor had virtually an open sky, for the weak Chinese Air Force was unable to offer strong opposition. Under the stimulus of civil war, from 191I to 1928, the several factions in China had developed air services consisting of a few obsolete aircraft pur- chased from abroad. Upon establishment of the central government in 1928, a more stable program was possible, and during the thirties an expansion and improvement of Chinese military aviation was accom- plished with the aid of foreign technical advisers. But the Chinese Air Force was in no sense prepared to meet the relatively modern air force with which the Japanese opened the war in 1937. By the end of the year the Chinese Air Force had been almost completely destroyed. Assistance from the Soviet Union and other nations enabled the Chi- nese to continue their air opposition, but their efforts were ineffectual. Lack of a modern training program, inadequate maintenance and repair facilities, and deficiencies in organization accounted for much of the weakness of the Chinese force.4 At the outbreak of the conflict in 1937 air combat on both sides was poorly executed, although there was no question as to the courage of either Chinese or Japanese pilots. Bombing was inaccurate, but the Japanese improved with practice and they revealed a talent for modify- ing their tactics in order to meet changing tactics of their opponents. The Chinese, forced to fight a defensive war on their own territory, concentrated on improving their interceptor aviation. In the early days of the fighting, Japanese bombers without pursuit protection made daylight attacks on Nanking and other cities, but following a few disastrous encounters with Chinese pursuit planes the bombing was halted until pursuit planes could be brought from Japan to provide the necessary protection. Japanese bombing formations, which at first numbered about nine planes, soon increased to an average of twenty- seven planes per wave of bombers. The attacks, against both Chinese troop concentrations and Chinese cities, were usually preceded by one or two reconnaissance planes which gathered weather information and intelligence of enemy air dispositions. Carrier- and shore-based planes of the naval air force operated against the Chinese, particularly in attacks on Chungking and in support of ground troops in the Shanghai and Tsingtao areas. The air force of the Japanese army participated 78
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