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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
F O R E W O R D
time. T h e job had to be accomplished within the limits of an indeter-
minate number of months or years. No one could predict the actual
duration of the war, but it was clear that at its end, or soon thereafter,
the historian must be prepared to bring to a close at least the prelimi-
nary selection and arrangement of his materials. It was hoped, to be
sure, that he would have an opportunity after the termination of hos-
tilities for more intensive study. But there was no escape from the
practical necessity of distinguishing between a war and a postwar
phase of the effort, and unavoidably the emphasis during that first
phase fell on the selection and collection of the materials themselves.
It being difficult to lay down principles of selection that were uni-
versally applicable, the decision was made to rely principally on the
judgment of professionally trained historians strategically placed at
key points of command. T h e first of those points, of course, was AAF
Headquarters itself. Though the Army Air Forces legally was no
more than a training and service organization operating within the
limits of this country, its headquarters, as will be demonstrated later,
was actually the nerve center controlling in large measure the entire
war effort in the air. And so, personnel of the Historical Office under-
took, each historian working in his own area of specialization and by
research initially in Headquarters files, to draw together as comprehen-
sive a record of the air effort as was physically possible within the
time limits operating and, while condensing this record into some
readily usable form, to treat it with a breadth of view appropriate to
the highest echelon of command. At the same time, and for the pur-
pose of supplementing Headquarters files with a selection from records
of action available only in the area of that action, an attempt was made
to secure the assignment of qualified historical personnel to the head-
quarters staff of each air force and command. T h e responsibility of the
historian so assigned was twofold: to act, first, as the historian of his
command for the purpose of recording its activities from the point of
view of its own headquarters and, second, to provide such professional
guidance as he could for those officers and enlisted men of the various
units comprising the command who, in addition to their other duties,
were charged with the preparation of the unit history. T h e unit his-
tory had long been required by Army regulations, and the effort of
the Historical Office in that particular was directed chiefly to the
establishment of standards that would lend to it greater historical
value. Thus the policy became essentially that of placing profession-
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