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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
F O R E W O R D
time. T h e job had to be accomplished within the limits of an indeter-
minate number of months or years. No one could predict the actual
duration of the war, but it was clear that at its end, or soon thereafter,
the historian must be prepared to bring to a close at least the prelimi-
nary selection and arrangement of his materials. It was hoped, to be
sure, that he would have an opportunity after the termination of hos-
tilities for more intensive study. But there was no escape from the
practical necessity of distinguishing between a war and a postwar
phase of the effort, and unavoidably the emphasis during that first
phase fell on the selection and collection of the materials themselves.
It being difficult to lay down principles of selection that were uni-
versally applicable, the decision was made to rely principally on the
judgment of professionally trained historians strategically placed at
key points of command. T h e first of those points, of course, was AAF
Headquarters itself. Though the Army Air Forces legally was no
more than a training and service organization operating within the
limits of this country, its headquarters, as will be demonstrated later,
was actually the nerve center controlling in large measure the entire
war effort in the air. And so, personnel of the Historical Office under-
took, each historian working in his own area of specialization and by
research initially in Headquarters files, to draw together as comprehen-
sive a record of the air effort as was physically possible within the
time limits operating and, while condensing this record into some
readily usable form, to treat it with a breadth of view appropriate to
the highest echelon of command. At the same time, and for the pur-
pose of supplementing Headquarters files with a selection from records
of action available only in the area of that action, an attempt was made
to secure the assignment of qualified historical personnel to the head-
quarters staff of each air force and command. T h e responsibility of the
historian so assigned was twofold: to act, first, as the historian of his
command for the purpose of recording its activities from the point of
view of its own headquarters and, second, to provide such professional
guidance as he could for those officers and enlisted men of the various
units comprising the command who, in addition to their other duties,
were charged with the preparation of the unit history. T h e unit his-
tory had long been required by Army regulations, and the effort of
the Historical Office in that particular was directed chiefly to the
establishment of standards that would lend to it greater historical
value. Thus the policy became essentially that of placing profession-
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.