“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
F O R E W O R D
time. T h e job had to be accomplished within the limits of an indeter-
minate number of months or years. No one could predict the actual
duration of the war, but it was clear that at its end, or soon thereafter,
the historian must be prepared to bring to a close at least the prelimi-
nary selection and arrangement of his materials. It was hoped, to be
sure, that he would have an opportunity after the termination of hos-
tilities for more intensive study. But there was no escape from the
practical necessity of distinguishing between a war and a postwar
phase of the effort, and unavoidably the emphasis during that first
phase fell on the selection and collection of the materials themselves.
It being difficult to lay down principles of selection that were uni-
versally applicable, the decision was made to rely principally on the
judgment of professionally trained historians strategically placed at
key points of command. T h e first of those points, of course, was AAF
Headquarters itself. Though the Army Air Forces legally was no
more than a training and service organization operating within the
limits of this country, its headquarters, as will be demonstrated later,
was actually the nerve center controlling in large measure the entire
war effort in the air. And so, personnel of the Historical Office under-
took, each historian working in his own area of specialization and by
research initially in Headquarters files, to draw together as comprehen-
sive a record of the air effort as was physically possible within the
time limits operating and, while condensing this record into some
readily usable form, to treat it with a breadth of view appropriate to
the highest echelon of command. At the same time, and for the pur-
pose of supplementing Headquarters files with a selection from records
of action available only in the area of that action, an attempt was made
to secure the assignment of qualified historical personnel to the head-
quarters staff of each air force and command. T h e responsibility of the
historian so assigned was twofold: to act, first, as the historian of his
command for the purpose of recording its activities from the point of
view of its own headquarters and, second, to provide such professional
guidance as he could for those officers and enlisted men of the various
units comprising the command who, in addition to their other duties,
were charged with the preparation of the unit history. T h e unit his-
tory had long been required by Army regulations, and the effort of
the Historical Office in that particular was directed chiefly to the
establishment of standards that would lend to it greater historical
value. Thus the policy became essentially that of placing profession-
xi