Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 668 …the Air Corps let contracts with the Sperry Gyroscope Company in 1933 for other improved models…
  • p. 670 …not re- ceived sufficient training with the Sperry bombsight, which for secu- rity reasons had been…
  • p. 671 …especially in reference to use of the Sperry sight; and that maintenance had been slow and…
  • p. 792 …Army Air Services, I I May 1942; ltr., Sperry Gyro- scope Co. to AAF Civilian Personnel…
  • p. 812 …A Sperry employee reported that bombardiers had dropped fewer than twenty-five practice bombs. (Ltr., Arnold…
  • p. 859 …636 Sperry bombsight, 599, 601
  • p. 860 …1 2 ; Hawaii, 17-75, 452-57; Sperry Gyroscope Co., 599 Spokane, 304 Sprague, Maj. C…
T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S
plane in radius of action, speed and fire power” were as yet just begin-
ning to be visualized. “The world struggle for strategic air bases and
effective air fleets is well under way,” he concluded, “and will become
intensified with the fast-moving technical development of the airplane.
Air Power is as vital a requirement to the military efficiency of a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory
in war for a nation in which it is lacking.”
These were the articles of faith on which the Army’s airmen stood
in the year of Munich, two years before the Battle of Britain. There
would appear to be little point in detailing further at this time the
continuing controversy with representatives of the W a r and Navy
departments. As noted at the close of the preceding section, the Joint
Board in June 1938-five months after General Andrews’ appeal to
the Secretary of War-officially denied the probability that the Air
Corps would in war require planes ‘(of greater practical ferrying
range, greater tactical radius, and greater carrying capacity than those
of the B- I 7.” Such a policy, if long adhered to, would have deprived
the AAF of the B-29. But world developments soon lent additional
weight to the arguments for the long-range bomber, and, when the
test came, the Army Air Forces not only had a well-defined doctrine
of air warfare for its guidance but the plane needed for the job.”
* For a discussion of the development of tactical principles, see below, pp. 597-99.
7’

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.