“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R 11
four-engine bombers (thirteen B-17’s and one B-IS) had been deliv-
ered to bombardment units of the GHQ Air Force.2oo
Admittedly there was a certain logic in the over-all policy followed,
and the principal cause for concern in the Air Corps was the evidence
of an inclination to deny the military need of the long-range bomber,
once the plane itself had been fully tested and proved. Leaders of the
Air Corps, therefore, tended to direct their arguments increasingly to
that point and, aided by the march of world events, to build their case
on the broadest possible base. General Andrews as commanding
general of the GHQ Air Force urged in June 1937 that the War
Department limit future procurement of bombardment aircraft to the
four-engine type, pointing out that a large number of twin-engine
models already were under contract; ‘01 and in a lengthy memorandum
of 24 January 1938 for the Secretary of War, he outlined plans that
would equip the GHQ Air Force with only two types of bombers,
heavy and light or attack bombers.’’’ H e undertook to meet the
argument that smaller planes were more economical by pointing out
the advantages in that particular of the heavy bomber-its “inter-
changeability of bomb and fuel load” and a consequent “greater flexi-
bility of employment.” “Airplanes that can be flown to theaters of
operations, continental, insular possessions, or foreign, in which this
country might become engaged,” he added, “and which can be trans-
ferred by air from one theater to another, have an obvious national
defense advantage with our limited shipping and in our particular
geographical situation.”
General Andrews conceded the claims of both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry and Battle-
ship.” But he expressed the hope that “the requirements for a broader
concept of the application of Air Power” might receive greater con-
sideration than had been the case theretofore:
It is a fact which has apparently been recognized by most of the great world
powers, that the airplane is an engine of war which has brought into being a
new and entirely different mode of warfare-the application of Air Power. It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air forces. It is another means operating in another element for the same basic
purpose as ground and sea power-the destruction of the enemy’s will to fight.
Moreover, air power, like land and sea power, “must be built up
around a basic element.” Bombardment aviation “is the basic element
of Air Power,” and “the future capabilities of the bombardment air-
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