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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R 11 four-engine bombers (thirteen B-17’s and one B-IS) had been deliv- ered to bombardment units of the GHQ Air Force.2oo Admittedly there was a certain logic in the over-all policy followed, and the principal cause for concern in the Air Corps was the evidence of an inclination to deny the military need of the long-range bomber, once the plane itself had been fully tested and proved. Leaders of the Air Corps, therefore, tended to direct their arguments increasingly to that point and, aided by the march of world events, to build their case on the broadest possible base. General Andrews as commanding general of the GHQ Air Force urged in June 1937 that the War Department limit future procurement of bombardment aircraft to the four-engine type, pointing out that a large number of twin-engine models already were under contract; ‘01 and in a lengthy memorandum of 24 January 1938 for the Secretary of War, he outlined plans that would equip the GHQ Air Force with only two types of bombers, heavy and light or attack bombers.’’’ H e undertook to meet the argument that smaller planes were more economical by pointing out the advantages in that particular of the heavy bomber-its “inter- changeability of bomb and fuel load” and a consequent “greater flexi- bility of employment.” “Airplanes that can be flown to theaters of operations, continental, insular possessions, or foreign, in which this country might become engaged,” he added, “and which can be trans- ferred by air from one theater to another, have an obvious national defense advantage with our limited shipping and in our particular geographical situation.” General Andrews conceded the claims of both the Army and the Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry and Battle- ship.” But he expressed the hope that “the requirements for a broader concept of the application of Air Power” might receive greater con- sideration than had been the case theretofore: It is a fact which has apparently been recognized by most of the great world powers, that the airplane is an engine of war which has brought into being a new and entirely different mode of warfare-the application of Air Power. It is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other air forces. It is another means operating in another element for the same basic purpose as ground and sea power-the destruction of the enemy’s will to fight. Moreover, air power, like land and sea power, “must be built up around a basic element.” Bombardment aviation “is the basic element of Air Power,” and “the future capabilities of the bombardment air- 7 0
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