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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N TWO WARS
sider such possibilities."'s" And yet, in the very year that saw the
beginning of another major European war, the Air Corps was engaged
in an attempt to secure relief from a prohibition which limited the
flight of its planes seaward to IOO miles beyond the ~ h o r e . ~ "That this
limitation apparently had been imposed by a verbal agreement between
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff is suggestive of
certain complications over the bomber program that had entered into
the relations of the Air Corps and the General Staff.
The War Department had given its approval to an experimental
interest in the long-range bomber as early as 1934. It had supported
the action leading to the development of the B-17, and though the
decision to limit the initial procurement to thirteen planes had proved
disappointing to the Air Corps, that decision nevertheless had main-
tained the project on a hopeful experimental basis. Further encourage-
ment came from W a r Department approval of a contract of 3 I Octo-
ber 1935 with the Douglas Aircraft Company for the design of an
experimental bomber even larger than the B- I 5 . The contract carried
an option for subsequent purchase of a prototype, and under an
authorization of 29 September 1936 that option was exercised through
a contract for the building of one experimental model.'08 Completed
in the spring of I 94 I and test-flown for the first time on 2 7 June I 941,
the Douglas XB- 19, with a span of 2 I 2 feet, a weight of 84,43 I pounds,
and a range of 5,200 miles, was the Army's largest prewar bomber.lgg
Tests proved that there were no fundamental flaws of design or
structure, but, as in the case of the B-15, the size and weight of the
plane were too great for the power plants. Consequently, the later
B-29, though it mounted engines more powerful than those of the
XB-19, was designed as a smaller plane. Only one experimental model
of the B-19 was built, but that paid more than ample dividends in the
lessons applied to future bomber development within the AAF.
The record shows, then, that within the four years following the
inauguration of Project A three major experimental projects had been
authorized for the purpose of exploring the potentialities of the big
plane and the long-range bomber. From the Air Corps point of view
the difficulty lay in the subsequent disinclination of the General Staff
to authorize the procurement of long-range bombers for equipment
of the GHQ Air Force. Though twenty-nine B-17's had been included
in the 1938 procurement program and eleven more for 1939, when
Germany attacked Poland in September of that year, only fourteen
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.