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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N TWO WARS
sider such possibilities."'s" And yet, in the very year that saw the
beginning of another major European war, the Air Corps was engaged
in an attempt to secure relief from a prohibition which limited the
flight of its planes seaward to IOO miles beyond the ~ h o r e . ~ "That this
limitation apparently had been imposed by a verbal agreement between
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff is suggestive of
certain complications over the bomber program that had entered into
the relations of the Air Corps and the General Staff.
The War Department had given its approval to an experimental
interest in the long-range bomber as early as 1934. It had supported
the action leading to the development of the B-17, and though the
decision to limit the initial procurement to thirteen planes had proved
disappointing to the Air Corps, that decision nevertheless had main-
tained the project on a hopeful experimental basis. Further encourage-
ment came from W a r Department approval of a contract of 3 I Octo-
ber 1935 with the Douglas Aircraft Company for the design of an
experimental bomber even larger than the B- I 5 . The contract carried
an option for subsequent purchase of a prototype, and under an
authorization of 29 September 1936 that option was exercised through
a contract for the building of one experimental model.'08 Completed
in the spring of I 94 I and test-flown for the first time on 2 7 June I 941,
the Douglas XB- 19, with a span of 2 I 2 feet, a weight of 84,43 I pounds,
and a range of 5,200 miles, was the Army's largest prewar bomber.lgg
Tests proved that there were no fundamental flaws of design or
structure, but, as in the case of the B-15, the size and weight of the
plane were too great for the power plants. Consequently, the later
B-29, though it mounted engines more powerful than those of the
XB-19, was designed as a smaller plane. Only one experimental model
of the B-19 was built, but that paid more than ample dividends in the
lessons applied to future bomber development within the AAF.
The record shows, then, that within the four years following the
inauguration of Project A three major experimental projects had been
authorized for the purpose of exploring the potentialities of the big
plane and the long-range bomber. From the Air Corps point of view
the difficulty lay in the subsequent disinclination of the General Staff
to authorize the procurement of long-range bombers for equipment
of the GHQ Air Force. Though twenty-nine B-17's had been included
in the 1938 procurement program and eleven more for 1939, when
Germany attacked Poland in September of that year, only fourteen
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.