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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“The Invaders”15 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 Employment of the GHQ Air Force,” a document incorporated in its essentials in the revision of Joint Action the following year, the baffling perplexities of pre-193 I policy regarding the role of aircraft in coastal defense had been in large part restored.lS4The GHQ Air Force as the principal element of the Army air component would operate “as an arm of the mobile Army, both in the conduct of air operations over the land in support of land operations and in the con- duct of air operations over the sea in direct defense of the coast.” When operating along the coast, it would maintain “such reconnais- sance as is essential to its combat efficiency.” But, in the absence of the fleet, primary responsibility for information of hostile fleet move- ments rested with “naval district forces supplemented by Army Air Corps units.” The three-phase activity of Army aviation against an enemy attack outlined in General MacArthur’s instructions of 3 January 1933+ was once again described, and in language much the same, but the need for such activity was now recognized, by implica- tion a t least, only in the absence of sufficient naval forces to engage the enemy a t sea. These and other points which might be mentioned are finely drawn and somewhat legalistic, but just there lay the trouble. Once again there was ample room for debate.t When the B-17 was delivered in 1937, it was enthusiastically received by the GHQ Air Force as “the best bombardment aircraft in existence, particularly for coastal defense.” l Q 5 But under existing cir- cumstances it proved far from easy to win recognition of the need for such a plane in coastal defense, and under existing national policy it was difficult to find any other justification for the long-range bomber than its capacity to contribute to the defense of our own coasts. “Airplanes could be built to fly across the Atlantic with a load of bombs and return, and the B-17 right now could make a one way trip and reinforce allies in Europe,” wrote the Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force in November 1937. “With landing fields at Wake and Guam,” he continued, “it could fly to the Philippines and Asia. However, our National Policy is defensive, and we do not now con- + See above, p. 63. t A section of Joint Action designed to minimize duplication between the services charged the Army with provision of aircraft for use in support of military operations, in direct defense of the coast, in repelling air raids against shore objectives or shi ping operations from aircraft carriers or other vessels and shore-based lanes for observa- zones. in harbors, and in support of naval forces. The Navy would provide aircraPt for don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the protection oPshipping in coastal 68
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