“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Employment of the GHQ Air Force,” a document incorporated in its
essentials in the revision of Joint Action the following year, the
baffling perplexities of pre-193 I policy regarding the role of aircraft
in coastal defense had been in large part restored.lS4The GHQ Air
Force as the principal element of the Army air component would
operate “as an arm of the mobile Army, both in the conduct of air
operations over the land in support of land operations and in the con-
duct of air operations over the sea in direct defense of the coast.”
When operating along the coast, it would maintain “such reconnais-
sance as is essential to its combat efficiency.” But, in the absence of the
fleet, primary responsibility for information of hostile fleet move-
ments rested with “naval district forces supplemented by Army Air
Corps units.” The three-phase activity of Army aviation against an
enemy attack outlined in General MacArthur’s instructions of 3
January 1933+ was once again described, and in language much the
same, but the need for such activity was now recognized, by implica-
tion a t least, only in the absence of sufficient naval forces to engage the
enemy a t sea. These and other points which might be mentioned are
finely drawn and somewhat legalistic, but just there lay the trouble.
Once again there was ample room for debate.t
When the B-17 was delivered in 1937, it was enthusiastically
received by the GHQ Air Force as “the best bombardment aircraft in
existence, particularly for coastal defense.” l Q 5 But under existing cir-
cumstances it proved far from easy to win recognition of the need for
such a plane in coastal defense, and under existing national policy it
was difficult to find any other justification for the long-range bomber
than its capacity to contribute to the defense of our own coasts.
“Airplanes could be built to fly across the Atlantic with a load of
bombs and return, and the B-17 right now could make a one way trip
and reinforce allies in Europe,” wrote the Commanding General of
the GHQ Air Force in November 1937. “With landing fields at Wake
and Guam,” he continued, “it could fly to the Philippines and Asia.
However, our National Policy is defensive, and we do not now con-
+ See above, p. 63.
t A section of Joint Action designed to minimize duplication between the services
charged the Army with provision of aircraft for use in support of military operations,
in direct defense of the coast, in repelling air raids against shore objectives or shi ping
operations from aircraft carriers or other vessels and shore-based lanes for observa-
zones.
in harbors, and in support of naval forces. The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the protection oPshipping in coastal
68