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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Employment of the GHQ Air Force,” a document incorporated in its
essentials in the revision of Joint Action the following year, the
baffling perplexities of pre-193 I policy regarding the role of aircraft
in coastal defense had been in large part restored.lS4The GHQ Air
Force as the principal element of the Army air component would
operate “as an arm of the mobile Army, both in the conduct of air
operations over the land in support of land operations and in the con-
duct of air operations over the sea in direct defense of the coast.”
When operating along the coast, it would maintain “such reconnais-
sance as is essential to its combat efficiency.” But, in the absence of the
fleet, primary responsibility for information of hostile fleet move-
ments rested with “naval district forces supplemented by Army Air
Corps units.” The three-phase activity of Army aviation against an
enemy attack outlined in General MacArthur’s instructions of 3
January 1933+ was once again described, and in language much the
same, but the need for such activity was now recognized, by implica-
tion a t least, only in the absence of sufficient naval forces to engage the
enemy a t sea. These and other points which might be mentioned are
finely drawn and somewhat legalistic, but just there lay the trouble.
Once again there was ample room for debate.t
When the B-17 was delivered in 1937, it was enthusiastically
received by the GHQ Air Force as “the best bombardment aircraft in
existence, particularly for coastal defense.” l Q 5 But under existing cir-
cumstances it proved far from easy to win recognition of the need for
such a plane in coastal defense, and under existing national policy it
was difficult to find any other justification for the long-range bomber
than its capacity to contribute to the defense of our own coasts.
“Airplanes could be built to fly across the Atlantic with a load of
bombs and return, and the B-17 right now could make a one way trip
and reinforce allies in Europe,” wrote the Commanding General of
the GHQ Air Force in November 1937. “With landing fields at Wake
and Guam,” he continued, “it could fly to the Philippines and Asia.
However, our National Policy is defensive, and we do not now con-
+ See above, p. 63.
t A section of Joint Action designed to minimize duplication between the services
charged the Army with provision of aircraft for use in support of military operations,
in direct defense of the coast, in repelling air raids against shore objectives or shi ping
operations from aircraft carriers or other vessels and shore-based lanes for observa-
zones.
in harbors, and in support of naval forces. The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the protection oPshipping in coastal
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.