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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S serious question that the latter could be expected in the future to perform traditional functions in connection with bombardment mis- sions. As he explained: During these exercises, observation aviation appeared woefully obsolete in performance, as did pursuit aviation in speed characteristics. Since new bom- bardment aircraft possesses speed above two hundred miles per hour, any inter- cepting o r supporting aircraft must possess greater speed characteristics if they are to perform their missions. In the case of pursuit aviation, this increase of speed must be so great as to make it doubtful whether pursuit aircraft can be efficiently or safely operated either individually or in mass. The answer to the problem thus posed was suggested in a statement of first-rate importance to an understanding of ideas which subse- quently governed the thinking of the Air Corps. “Bombardment avia- tion,” General Westover observed, “has defensive fire power of such quantity and effectiveness as to warrant the belief that with its modern speeds it may be capable of effectively accomplishing its assigned mission without support.” Indeed, the “ability of bombardment avia- tion to fly in close formation and thus to insure greater defense against air attack, together with improved efficiency of silencers and camouflage,” argued that “no known agency can frustrate the accom- plishment of a bombardment mission.” lS6 That the bomber would have the first call in the development of new equipment, and that the trend of thought favored a combination of the reconnaissance and bombardment function in one plane, was suggested by an engineering study, undertaken in July 1933 by the Ma- teriel Division at Wright Field, of the problem of “maximum range” with “a 2,000 pound bomb load.” The result of that study indicated that a range of 5,000 miles at a speed of 2 0 0 miles per hour was prac- ticable. Accordingly, in December the Air Corps submitted to the War Department in its so-called Project A a proposal to build a plane of that range. In support of the proposal it was pointed out that such a plane would “not alone reinforce either coast line.. . but would definitely enable.. .reinforcement of.. . Panama and Hawaii.” l S 7 T h e action of the War Department General Staff was prompt enough. Tentative approval having been given on 19 December 1933, a $609,300 Air Corps budget for long-range bomber development was approved “in principle” on 1 2 February 1934, and on 1 2 May the Chief of Staff authorized the negotiation of contracts with the Boeing and Martin companies for preliminary designs and engineering 65
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