Symposium on unidentified flying objects: hearings before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninetieth Congress, second session, July 29, 1968.

130
performance
experimental
radar
having
a
one-third
degree
beam
width.
For
lockon
and
track,
an
object
would have
to
be
pinpointed
to
one
-sixth
degree,
and
even
if
the radar
did
achieve
lockon,
an
erratically
moving
object
could
not be
followed
even
in the
STPF
radar's
monopulse
mode
of
operation.
For
this
reason
only
satellites
having
rather
well-defined
paths
(i.e.,
ephemerides),
which have
been
precomputed,can
be
acquired
and
tracked.
Our
three
BEMEWS
radars
propagate
fans of
electromagnetic
energy
into space.
If a
ballistic
missile
or
satellite
penetrates
two
of
these
fans
successively,
then
it
can
be
identified.
Since astrodynamical
laws
govern
the
time
interval
between
detection
fan
penetrations
for
"normal"
space
objects,
all
other anomalistic
"hits"
by
the
radar
are
usually neglected,
and
even
if
they
are
not
neglected,
they
are
usually
classified
as
spurious
images
or
misassociated
targets,
and
are stored
away
on
magnetic
tape,
and
forgotten.
One
space
surveillance
site
operates
a
detection
radar
(FPS
-17)
and a
tracking
radar
(FPS
-79).
If
a
new
space
object
is
sensed
by
the
detection
radar's
fans,
then the
tracking
radar
can
be
oriented
toachieve lockon.
The
orientation
is
governed
by
a knowledge of
theappropriate
"normal"
object's
astrodynamic
laws
of
motion, or
by an
assumption
as to
launch
point.
Thus,
if
an
unknown
is
detected,
and
if
it
follows
an
unusual
path,
it
is
unlikely
that
it
could,
or
would,
be
tracked.
Furthermore,
the
director
of
the
radar
may
make
a
decision
that
the
unknown
object detected
is
not of
interest
(because
of
the
location
of
the
FPS
-17
fan
penetration
or
because
of
the
lack
of
prior
information
on a
possible
new
launch).
In
the absence
of
detection
fan
penetration
(the
fan
has
a
rather limited
coverage), the
FPS
-79
tracking
radar
is
tasked to follow other space
objects
on a
schedule
provided
by
the
Space
Defense
Center,
and
again
there
is
almost
no
likelihood
that
an
anomalistic object
could,
or
would,
be
tracked.
The
NASA
radars,
such
as those
at
Millstone
and
Goldstone, are
not
intended
to
be
surveillance
radars,
and
only
track
known
space
objects
on
command.
Again
the chances
of
their
tracking anomalistic
objects
are nearly
nil.
The new
phased
-array
radar at
Eglin
AFB
(FPS
-85)
has
considerable capability
for deploying
detection
fans
and
tracking space
objects
in
a
simultaneous
fashion.
Such
versatility
raises
certain
energy
-management problems—that
is,
determining
howmuch
energy
to
allocate
to
detection
and
how much
to
tracking—but
this
sensor
might have a
capability (albeit,
perhaps,limited) to
detect
and
track anomalistic
objects.
The
problem
is
that the
logic
included
in the software
associated
with the
FPS
-85's control
computers
is
notorganized in
a
fashion to
detect
and
track anomalistic objects
(I
will
indicate
in
a
moment how
the
logic
could be
modified).
Furthermore,the
FPS
-85,
like
the other surveillance
radars
is
usually tasked to
track
a
list
of
catalogued space
objects
in the
Space Defense
Center's
data base
and
the opportunity to
"look around"
for anomalistic objectsis
quite limited.
There
are
a number
of other radar
surveillance
systems such as
a
detection fence across the United
States.
In
the
case
of
this fence,
we
have a
situation similar to
BMEWS,
in
which the time
interval
between
succesive penetrations (in
this case separated
by an
orbital
period for
satellites)
must
follow prescribed astrodynamical laws.
If they do
not, then the fence penetrations are either deleted
from