Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“The Advance”34 pages
85 the People's Republic of China. This project had its ongms 10 a RAND Corporation study from 1951. By the end of I 955, the Air Force had overcome a number of technical problems in camera design and recovery techniques and had manufactured a large number of bal loons for use in the project. President Eisenhower gave his approval on 27 December 1955, and two weeks later the launches from bases in Western Europe began. By the end of February 1956, the Air Force had launched a total of 516 balloons.67 Project GENETRIX was much less successful than its sponsors had hoped. Once launched, the balloons were at the mercy of the pre vailing winds, and many tended to drift toward southern Europe and then across the Black Sea and the desert areas of China. These bal loons therefore missed the prime target areas, which lay in the higher latitudes. Large numbers of balloons did not succeed in crossing the Soviet Union and China, some because they were shot down by hos tile aircraft, others because they prematurely expended their ballast supplies and descended too soon. Only 46 payloads were eventually recovered (one more than a year later and the last not until 1958) from the 5 16 balloons that had been launched. In four of these pay- Joads the camera had malfunctioned, and in another eight _the photog raphy was of no intelligence value. Thus, only 34 balloons succeeded in obtaining useful photographs."" The low success rate of the Project GENETRIX balloons was not the only problem encountered; far more serious was the storm of pro test and unfavorable publicity that the balloon overflights provoked. Although the Air Force had issued a cover story that the balloons were being used for weather research connected with the International Geophysical Year, East European nations protested strongly to the United States and to international aviation authorities, claiming that the balloons endangered civilian aircraft. The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from which the balloons had been launched. The Soviets also col lected numerous polyethelene gasbags, camera payloads, and trans mitters from GENETRIX balloons and put them on display in 9 Moscow for the world press.~ ., P. G. Strong, Attachment to Memorandum for DCI Dulles. "Project GENETRIX Summary." 15 February 1956 (S). "' Final Report. Project I 19L. 1st Air Division (Meteorological Survey) Strategic Air Command. 5 Mar~·h 1956. D-582, Genernl Summary (S. declassitic:d 1979). "'' New Yr,rk Times, IO February 1956. p. I: Omaha World Herald, 11 February I 956, p. I. Sec.el NOfOftN Chapter 2 Sea,et
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.