Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 5 …139 Cooperation With Norway ....................................................................... 142 Declining Overflight Activity.................................................................... 143 Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U…
  • p. 7 …320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance Program o n the…
  • p. 91 …Early in the program Bissell and Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation…
  • p. 95 …their awareness of the vital nature of their mission kept the level of cooperation high. The…
  • p. 143 …deception project since its early days, he cooperated reluctantly because he disliked adding attachments that made…
  • p. 155 …the beginning of cooperation between CIA and the Norwegian Intelligence Service on the U-2 program…
  • p. 167 …By 1957 cooperation be tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to include…
  • p. 169 …a logical ex tension of the close cooperation that already existed between the two countries on…
  • p. 196 …as possible while giving the appearance of cooperating with his cap tors. To extract the maximum…
  • p. 287 …by Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G) in cooperation with the Scientific Engineering Institute at a small…
  • p. 302 …Halaby cooperated fully with the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how to…
  • p. 334 …The cooperation between the Agency and the Air Force that began with the U-2 and…
85
the People's Republic of China. This project had its ongms 10 a
RAND Corporation study from 1951. By the end of I 955, the Air
Force had overcome a number of technical problems in camera design
and recovery techniques and had manufactured a large number of bal
loons for use in the project. President Eisenhower gave his approval
on 27 December 1955, and two weeks later the launches from bases
in Western Europe began. By the end of February 1956, the Air Force
had launched a total of 516 balloons.67
Project GENETRIX was much less successful than its sponsors
had hoped. Once launched, the balloons were at the mercy of the pre
vailing winds, and many tended to drift toward southern Europe and
then across the Black Sea and the desert areas of China. These bal
loons therefore missed the prime target areas, which lay in the higher
latitudes. Large numbers of balloons did not succeed in crossing the
Soviet Union and China, some because they were shot down by hos
tile aircraft, others because they prematurely expended their ballast
supplies and descended too soon. Only 46 payloads were eventually
recovered (one more than a year later and the last not until 1958)
from the 5 16 balloons that had been launched. In four of these pay-
Joads the camera had malfunctioned, and in another eight _the photog
raphy was of no intelligence value. Thus, only 34 balloons succeeded
in obtaining useful photographs.""
The low success rate of the Project GENETRIX balloons was not
the only problem encountered; far more serious was the storm of pro
test and unfavorable publicity that the balloon overflights provoked.
Although the Air Force had issued a cover story that the balloons
were being used for weather research connected with the International
Geophysical Year, East European nations protested strongly to the
United States and to international aviation authorities, claiming that
the balloons endangered civilian aircraft. The Soviet Union sent
strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations
from which the balloons had been launched. The Soviets also col
lected numerous polyethelene gasbags, camera payloads, and trans
mitters from GENETRIX balloons and put them on display in
9
Moscow for the world press.~
., P. G. Strong, Attachment to Memorandum for DCI Dulles. "Project GENETRIX
Summary." 15 February 1956 (S).
"' Final Report. Project I 19L. 1st Air Division (Meteorological Survey) Strategic Air
Command. 5 Mar~·h 1956. D-582, Genernl Summary (S. declassitic:d 1979).
"'' New Yr,rk Times, IO February 1956. p. I: Omaha World Herald, 11 February I 956, p. I.
Sec.el NOfOftN
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.