Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 143 …Air Force contract to evaluate ra dars, EG&G operated a small testing facility at Indian…
  • p. 244 …Then in August 1964, following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Air Force assumed responsibility for…
  • p. 381 …232 Indian Springs, Nevada 274. 130, 132 Indonesia 211-212, 214,319 Indonesian Air Force 212…
82
Gee, et NOFOAN
Chapter 2
Arthur C. Lundahl
ARC gave the top priority target list to the Project Director, and
tlie project staff's operations section then used the list to plarn the
tlightpachs for U-2 missions. Although the requirements committee
was not responsible for developing fl ight plans. it assisted the plan
ners with detailed target information as required. When a flight plan
was ready for submission to the President for approval, the committee
drew up a decailed justi fication for the selection of the targets. This
paper accompanied the flight plan.(J
[n developing and pnontIz1ng lists of targets, the committee
members had to take into account the varying needs and interesIts of
their parent organizations. Thus, the CIA representatives generally
emphasized strategic intelligence: ai rcraft and munitions factories,
power-generating complexes. nuclear establishments. roads. bridlges.
inland waterways. In contrast, the military services usually plac,ed a
heavier emphasis on order-of-baule data. The Air Force. in panicular.
had a strong interest in gathering intelligence on the location of
Soviet and East European airfields and radars.
A lthough the committee members kept the interests of their ser
vices or agencies in mind. their awareness of the vital nature of their
mission kept the level of cooperation high. The group always attempted
to reach a consensus before issuing its recommendations, although oc
casionally this was not possible and one or more agencies would add a
dissent to the recommendation o f the committee as a whole."5
PREPARATIONS TO HANDLE THE
PRODUCT OF U-2 MISSIONS
On 13 December 1954, DCI Allen Dulles and his assistant. Richard
Bissell, briefed Arthur C. Lundahl. the chief of CIA's Photo
Intelligence Division (PID), on Project AQU ATONE. At !DC[
Dulles's direction, Lundahl immediately set in motion within his divi
sion a compartmented effort, known as Project EQUINE, to plan for
the exploication of overhead photography from the U-2 project. With
only 13 members, the PID staff was too small co handle the expe,cted
~ lbi<l.: Jam.:s Q. Reber. interview by Donald E. Wd·lenbach and Gregory W. Pedlow.
Wash ington, DC. 21 May 1987 (S).
"' Reber interview (Sl.
Gec,et

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.