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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 5 …139 Cooperation With Norway ....................................................................... 142 Declining Overflight Activity.................................................................... 143 Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U…
  • p. 7 …320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance Program o n the…
  • p. 91 …Early in the program Bissell and Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation…
  • p. 95 …their awareness of the vital nature of their mission kept the level of cooperation high. The…
  • p. 143 …deception project since its early days, he cooperated reluctantly because he disliked adding attachments that made…
  • p. 155 …the beginning of cooperation between CIA and the Norwegian Intelligence Service on the U-2 program…
  • p. 167 …By 1957 cooperation be tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to include…
  • p. 169 …a logical ex tension of the close cooperation that already existed between the two countries on…
  • p. 196 …as possible while giving the appearance of cooperating with his cap tors. To extract the maximum…
  • p. 287 …by Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G) in cooperation with the Scientific Engineering Institute at a small…
  • p. 302 …Halaby cooperated fully with the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how to…
  • p. 334 …The cooperation between the Agency and the Air Force that began with the U-2 and…
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Secret NOfORN
Chapter 2
U-2 detachment in formation
over Nevada
Colonel Yancey's group carefully examined all aspects of the
U-2 unit from flight crews to camera technicians and mission pro
grammers. When the exercise was over, Yancey reported that the de
tachment was ready for deployment. He then briefed a high-level
Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force and the
Chief of Air Staff. These officials concurred with Yancey's detem1i
nation that the U-2 was ready for deployment.57
During these final tests in the spring of 1956, the U-2 once again
demonstrated its unique airworthiiness. On 14 April 1956, James
Cunningham was sitting in his office in Washington when he received
a call from Area 51 informing him that a westward-bound U-2 had
experienced a flameout over the Mississippi River at the western bor
der of Tennessee. After restarting his engine, the pilot reported a sec
ond flameout and engine vibrations so violent that he was unable to
get the power plant to start again. Early in the program Bissell and
Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation of
the Air Force, had arranged for sealled orders to be delivered to every
airbase in the continental United States giving instructions about what
to do if a U-2 needed to make an e:mergency landing.
Cunningham had the project office ask the pilot how far he could
glide so they could determine which SAC base should be alerted. The
pilot, who by this time was over Arkansas. radioed back that, given
the prevailing winds and the U-2·s 21:1 glide ratio, he thought he
could reach Albuquerque. New Mexico. Within minutes Cunningham
was on the phone to Colonel Geary in the Pentagon, who then had the
Air Force's Assistant Director of Operations. Brig. Gen. Ralph E.
" Bbscll imcrvicw (S); OSA flisrory. chap. 11. pp. 15-16 (TS Codeword).
Geeret

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.