Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Cooper”12 pages
76 Seerct NOFORN Chapter 2 and could not survive the stresses of loops and barrel rolls. Moreover, the original U-2s were placarded, which meant that they could not be flown at sea level faster than 190 knots in smooth air or 150 knots in rough air. At operational altitude, where the air was much less dense, they could not exceed Mach 0.8 (394 knots). Speeds in excess of these limits could cause the wings or tail section to fall off. Airspeed was a very critical factor for the U-2. At maximum alti tude only 6 knots separated the speeds at which low-speed stall and high-speed buffet occurred. Pilots called this narrow range of accept able airspeeds at maximum altitude the .. coffin corner" because at this point the U-2 was always on the brink of falling out of the sky. If the aircraft slowed beyond the low-speed stall limit, it would lose lift and begin to fall, causing stresses that would tear the wings and tail off. A little too much speed would lead to buffeting, which would also cause the loss of the wings or tail. Flying conditions such as these required a U-2 pilot's full attention when he was not using the autopilot. Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle to allow the pilot to make minute alterations to the fuel supply. 50 Among the unique devices developed for the U-2 was a small sextant for making celestial .. fixes" during the long overflights. Because cloud cover often prevented U-2 pilots from locating naviga tional points on the earth through the periscope, the sextant turned out to be the pilots' principal navigational instrument during the first three years of deployment. When clouds were not a factor, however. the periscope proved highly accurate for navigation. During the final tests before the aircraft became operational. U-2 pilots found they could navigate by dead reckoning with an error of less than I nautical mile over a 1.000-nm course.5' FINAL TESTS OF THE U-2 Flight-testing of the U-2 continued throughout the fall and winter of 1955-56 in order to test all the various systems. By mid-January 1956. SAC officials were so impressed that they also wanted to pur chase a fleet of these planes. On 30 January. DCI Dulles agreed to " Cunningham int.:rview (TS Codeword): John Parangosky. intt:rview by Donald E. Wdzenhach. tape recording. 6 March 1986 (S): information supplied by James Ch..:rbonneaux to Donald E. Wdzenhach (S). " Cunningham interview (TS Codeword). Seci:et
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.