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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 18 …Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not…
  • p. 20 …Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in…
  • p. 22 …become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business…
  • p. 24 …for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon official s…
  • p. 26 …He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon…
  • p. 27 …with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve…
  • p. 52 …Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to go to the Pentagon…
  • p. 91 …He then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force…
  • p. 92 …After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled…
  • p. 225 …By 25 September 1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the course of events…
  • p. 251 …Early in 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to de velop a high…
  • p. 363 …CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War fl. New York: William Morrow, 1986. ---. The Soviet…
71
Le Vier made an additional 19 flights in article 341 before mov
ing on to other Lockheed flight test programs in early September.
This first phase of U-2 testing explored the craft's stall envelope, took
the aircraft to its maximum stress limit (2.5 g's), and explored its
speed potential. LeVier soon flew the aircraft at its maximum speed
of Mach 0.85. Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti
tudes never before attained in sustained flight. On 16 August LeVier
took the aircraft up to 52,000 feet. In preparation for this flight, the
42-year-old test pilot completed the Air Force partial-pressure suit
training program, becoming the oldest pilot to do so. Testing at even
higher altitudes continued, and on 8 September the U-2 reached its
initial design altitude of 65,600 feet. 05
On 22 September 1955, the U-2 experienced its first flameout at
64,000 feet-more than 12 miles up. After a brief restart, the 157/
P-37 engine again flamed out at 60,000 feet, and the aircraft
descended to 35,000 feet before the engine could be relit. Engineers
from Pratt & Whitney immediately set to work on this problem. The
P-37 model engine had significantly poorer combustion characteris
_ti~~ than the preferred but unavailable P-31 version and therefore
tended to flame out at high altitudes. Combustion problems usually
became apparent as the U-2 began the final part of its climb from
57,000 to 65,000 feet, causing pilots to refer to this area as the "bad
lands" or the "chimney." F\ameouts bedeviled the U-2 project until
sufficient numbers of the more powerful P-31 engines became avail
able in the spring of 1956:0
Meanwhile, with the airworthiness of the U-2 airframe proven,
Lockheed set up a production line in the Skunk Works, but delivery of
even the second-choice 157/P-37 engines became a major problem.
Pratt & Whitney's full production capacity for these engines for the
next year was contracted to the Air Force for use in F-100 fighters
and KC-135 tankers. Colonel Geary, with the help of a colleague in
the Air Force Materiel Command, managed to arrange the diversion
of a number of these engines from a shipment destined for Boeing's
KC-135 production line, making it possible to continue building the
U-2s.47
" OSA Chronology, p. 7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22.
"' OSA Hiswry, chap. 8, pp. 12-14 (TS Codeword).
" Geary interview (S ).
Sectel NOFORP•
Chapter 2
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.