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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
71
Le Vier made an additional 19 flights in article 341 before mov
ing on to other Lockheed flight test programs in early September.
This first phase of U-2 testing explored the craft's stall envelope, took
the aircraft to its maximum stress limit (2.5 g's), and explored its
speed potential. LeVier soon flew the aircraft at its maximum speed
of Mach 0.85. Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti
tudes never before attained in sustained flight. On 16 August LeVier
took the aircraft up to 52,000 feet. In preparation for this flight, the
42-year-old test pilot completed the Air Force partial-pressure suit
training program, becoming the oldest pilot to do so. Testing at even
higher altitudes continued, and on 8 September the U-2 reached its
initial design altitude of 65,600 feet. 05
On 22 September 1955, the U-2 experienced its first flameout at
64,000 feet-more than 12 miles up. After a brief restart, the 157/
P-37 engine again flamed out at 60,000 feet, and the aircraft
descended to 35,000 feet before the engine could be relit. Engineers
from Pratt & Whitney immediately set to work on this problem. The
P-37 model engine had significantly poorer combustion characteris
_ti~~ than the preferred but unavailable P-31 version and therefore
tended to flame out at high altitudes. Combustion problems usually
became apparent as the U-2 began the final part of its climb from
57,000 to 65,000 feet, causing pilots to refer to this area as the "bad
lands" or the "chimney." F\ameouts bedeviled the U-2 project until
sufficient numbers of the more powerful P-31 engines became avail
able in the spring of 1956:0
Meanwhile, with the airworthiness of the U-2 airframe proven,
Lockheed set up a production line in the Skunk Works, but delivery of
even the second-choice 157/P-37 engines became a major problem.
Pratt & Whitney's full production capacity for these engines for the
next year was contracted to the Air Force for use in F-100 fighters
and KC-135 tankers. Colonel Geary, with the help of a colleague in
the Air Force Materiel Command, managed to arrange the diversion
of a number of these engines from a shipment destined for Boeing's
KC-135 production line, making it possible to continue building the
U-2s.47
" OSA Chronology, p. 7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22.
"' OSA Hiswry, chap. 8, pp. 12-14 (TS Codeword).
" Geary interview (S ).
Sectel NOFORP•
Chapter 2
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.