Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
69
followed on I August. Le Vier accelerated to 70 knots and began to try
the ailerons. ·'It was at this point that I became aware of being air
borne.'' LeYier noted afterward. "which left me with utter amaze
ment, as I had no intentions whatsoever of flying. I immediately
started back toward the ground, but had difficulty determining my
height because the lakebed had no markings to judge distance or
height. I made contact with the ground in a left bank of approximately
l 0 degrees." The U-2 bounced back into the air, but Le Vier was able
to bring it back down for a second landing. He then applied the brakes
with little effect, and the aircraft rolled for a long distance before
. ,,
coming to a stop. -
Bissell, Cunningham. and Johnson saw the aircraft fall and
bounce. Leaping into a jeep, they roared off toward the plane. They
signaled to Le Vier to climb out and then used fire extinguishers to put
out a fire in the brakes. At a debriefing session that followed. LeYier
complained about the poor performance of the brakes and the absence
of markings on the runway. Damage to the prototype U-2 was very
minor: blown tires, a leaking oleostrut on the undercarriage, and dam
aged brakes. This unplanned flight was but a foretaste of the airwor
thiness of the U-2. New pilots all had difficulty in getting the U-2's
wheels on the ground because at low speeds it would remain in
ground effect and glide effortlessly above the runway for great dis
tances.
Taxi trials continued for one more day and were followed by the
first planned flight on 4 August 1955. LeVier was again at the con
trols and had been instructed by Kelly Johnson to land the U-2 by
making initial contact with the main or forward landing gear and let
ting the plane settle back on the rear wheel. LeVier had disagreed
with this approach. believing that the U-2 would bounce if he tried to
touch down on the forward gear first. After flying the aircraft up to
8,000 feet, Le Vier leveled off and began cycling the landing gear up
and down: then he tested the flaps and the plane's stability and control
systems. Finally. LeYier made his first landing approach. As the U-2
settled down. the forward landing gear touched the runway and the
plane skipped and bounced into the air. Le Vier made a second attempt
to land front wheels first. and again the plane bounded into the air.
'' Transcripts of th.: test pilors· and obs.:rv.:rs· comments on the initial U-2 tt:st flights
have been published in ··secret First Flight of Artide 0OI ... Spyplanes vol. 2. 1988. pp.
64• 7 I. 82-85.
Sect et NOFORN
Chapter 2
Sesret

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.