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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also played a part in maintaining…
  • p. 94 …The committee issued its l ist of cargets for the use of the entire intelli gence…
  • p. 147 …The Agency then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C to use the…
  • p. 180 …James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to the maximum degree…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to i llustrate…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional bui ldings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy…
  • p. 348 …Following modifications to make System-VII suitable for use by the Navy, the designation was changed…
  • p. 353 …In 1968 tests on an AQUILINE prototype at Randsburg Wash on the US Navy's Naval…
  • p. 401 …247, 328 US Marine Corps Reserve 14 US Military Academy at West Point 329 US Navy…
Sec,st NOFORN
Chapter 2
60
devices had to be calibrated to 80,000 feet. This immediately raised
eyebrows at Kollman because its instruments only went to 45,000
feet. Agency security personnel quickly briefed several Kollman offi
cials and produced a cover story that the altimeters were to be used on
experimental rocket planes. 27
THE CIA - AIR FORCE PARTNERSHIP
At the initial interagency meetings to establish the U-2 program in
December 1954, the participants did not work out a clear delineation
of responsibilities between the CIA and the Air Force. They agreed
only that the Air Force would supply the engines and the Agency
would pay for the airframes and cameras. With a myriad of details still
unsettled, CIA and Air Force representatives began to work on an
interagency agreement that would assign specific responsibilities for
the program. These negotiations proved difficult. Discussions on this
subject between DCI Allen Dulles and Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan
Twining began in March 1955. Twining wanted SAC, headed by Gen.
Curtis E. LeMay, to run the project once the planes and pilots were
ready to fly, but Dulles opposed such an arrangement. The CIA-USAF
talks dragged on for several months, with Twining determined that
SAC should have full control once the aircraft was deployed.
Eventually President Eisenhower settled the dispute. "I want this
whole thing to be a civilian operation," the President wrote. "If uni
formed personnel of the armed services of the United States fly over
Russia, it is an act of war-legally-and I don't want any part of it." 28
With the issue of control over the program settled, the two agen
cies soon worked out the remaining details. On 3 August 1955, Dulles
and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the basic
agreement, titled "Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities
Project OILSTONE" (OILSTONE was the Air Force codename for the
project). This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection
and training, weather information, mission plotting, and operational
support. The Agency was responsible for cameras, security, contract
ing, film processing, and arrangements for foreign bases, and it also
had a voice in the selection of pilots. All aeronautical aspects of the
n Ibid.
,. OSA History. chap. 3, pp. 8-15 (TS Codeword): Beschloss, Mayday, pp. 105-107.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.