Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 19 …staff was the RB-57D in I 955, whose maximum altitude RAF Canberra Mark-PR3 Seeret
  • p. 36 …In 1952 the Royal Air Force (RAF) began Project ROBIN, which was designed to modify the…
  • p. 106 …The U-2s were to use Lakenheath AFB, an RAF base also used by the USAF…
  • p. 107 …penetrated the British radar net work, causing RAF fighters to scramble. Afterward the Air Ministry made…
  • p. 122 …twin-engine Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in 1953. The US…
  • p. 156 …Range for the first time since the RAF's overflight in 1953, obtaining photographs of a…
  • p. 166 …In November 1958, four RAF officers arrived at Detachment B at Adana. thus beginning the United…
  • p. 167 …ask Air Vice Marshal MacDonald if the RAF was prepared to '"" See, for ex:ample, the…
  • p. 168 …MacDonald agreed to Bissell's proposal and began recruiting RAF pilots to fly the U-2…
  • p. 169 …Most flights by the RAF pilots in Detachment B, however, took place in the Middle East…
  • p. 177 …For almost a year, the RAF pilots of Detachment B had been ready to fly over…
  • p. 194 …A four-man unit of RAF U-2 pilots was stationed at Detachment G, Edwards AFB…
  • p. 200 …approval authority for missions conducted by the RAF pilots in Detachment 8. The loss of Powers…
  • p. 316 …Project IDEALIST U-2 flying from an RAF facility in Great Britain. The OXCART would fly…
  • p. 332 …1960, the need for British participation lessened. RAF pilots henceforth flew only training or ferry missions…
  • p. 339 …P-E PFIAB PI PIC PID PSAC RAF RFP SAB SAC SAC SA/PC/DCI SAM…
  • p. 351 …4154 Powers Peshawar B B Tyuratam, Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk; downed by SAM a RAF pilot Sec1 et
  • p. 402 …Louis 29 Watertown Strip 57 Watton RAF Base. England 156 "weather plane" cover story 179 weather…
55
Realizing that the 240-inch lens was both too large and too
heavy for the camera bay, Baker scaled the lens down to a 200-inch
f/16. 0 system. This was still too big. Further reductions followed, re
sulting by July 1955 in a 120-inch fl 10.9 lens that met both the weight
and space limitations. Later in the year, Baker decided to make the
mirrors for the system out of a new, lightweight foamed silica mate
rial developed by Pittsburgh-Coming Glass Company. This reduced
the weight significantly, and he was able to scale up the lens to a
180-inch f/13.85 reflective system for a 13- by 13-inch format. In the
past, the calculations for such a complex camera lens would have
taken years to complete, but thanks to Baker's ray-tracing computer
program, he was able to accomplish the task in just 16 days.
When a C camera built by Hycon was flight-tested on 31 January
l 957, project engineers discovered that its 180-inch focal length,
which was five times longer than that of the B camera, made the
camera very sensitive to aircraft vibration and led to great difficulty
in aiming the C camera from altitudes above 68,000 feet. The engi
neers, therefore, decided to shelve the camera. More than five years
later, a redesigned C camera was employed during the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 0ctober 1962, but the results were not very satisfactory.
The failure of the C camera design was not a serious setback to
the high-altitude reconnaissance program, because the B camera
proved highly successful. Once initial difficulties with the film-trans
port system were overcome, the B camera became the workhorse of
high-altitude photography. An improved version known as the B-2 is
still in use. Both of the earlier A-model cameras were phased out after
September 1958.
During the period when he was designing lenses for the CIA's
overhead reconnaissance program, James Baker was also working on
classified lens designs for the Air Force and unclassified designs for
the Smithsonian Institution. To protect the security of Baker's work
for the Agency, Herbert Miller of the Development Projects Staff told
Baker to work on lenses for the U-2 in the open and not make any
effort to classify the documents connected with the project. Miller be
lieved that by not calling attention to the effort through the use of spe
cial security measures, the project could be completed faster and still
not be compromised. This "hiding in the open" strategy proved very
successful?
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.