Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also played a part in maintaining…
  • p. 94 …The committee issued its l ist of cargets for the use of the entire intelli gence…
  • p. 147 …The Agency then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C to use the…
  • p. 180 …James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to the maximum degree…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to i llustrate…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional bui ldings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy…
  • p. 348 …Following modifications to make System-VII suitable for use by the Navy, the designation was changed…
  • p. 353 …In 1968 tests on an AQUILINE prototype at Randsburg Wash on the US Navy's Naval…
  • p. 401 …247, 328 US Marine Corps Reserve 14 US Military Academy at West Point 329 US Navy…
44
Sasret NOFORN
Chapter 2
use. Public Law 110, approved by the 81st Congress on 20 June 1949,
designates the Director of Central Intelligence as the only government
employee who can obligate Federal money without the use of vouch
ers. By using unvouchered funds, it is possible to eliminate competi
tive bidding and thereby limit the number of parties who know about
a given project. The use of unvouchered funds also speeds up the
Federal procurement cycle. A general contractor such as Lockheed
can purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed for a project
without resorting at each step to the mandated procurement proce
dures involving public, competitive bidding. Covert contracting also
permits the use of second and third parties, many of them dummy
corporations or unwitting suppliers, thus hiding the intended destina
tion or use of the various purchases.
In mid-December 1954, President Eisenhower authorized DCI
Dulles to use $35 million from the Agency's Contingency Reserve Fund
to finance the U-2 project. Then on 22 December 1954, the Agency
signed a letter contract with Lockheed, using the codename Project
OARFISH. The Agency had proposed to give Lockheed "performance
specifications., rather than the standard Air Force "technical specifica
tions," which were more rigid and demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed
that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed's original pro
posal to the Air Force in May l 954 had been $28 million for 20 U-2s
equipped with GE 173 engines. During negotiations with CIA General
Counsel Lawrence R. Houston, Lockheed changed its proposal to $26
million for 20 airframes plus a two-seat trainer model and spares; the Air
Force was to furnish the engines. Houston insisted that the Agency could
only budget $22.5 million for the airframes because it needed the balance
of the available $35 million for cameras and life-support gear. The two
sides finally agreed on a fixed-price contract with a provision for a re
view three-fourths of the way through to determine if the costs were
going to exceed the $22.5 million figure. The formal contract, No.
SP-1913, was signed on 2 March 1955 and called for the delivery of the
first U-2 in July 1955 and the last in November 1956. Meanwhile, to
keep work moving at Lockheed, Richard Bissell wrote a check for
$1,256,000 I ~nd mailed it to Kelly Johnson's
home on 21 February 1955.9
• John S. Warner. Oftice of the General Counsel, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach,
Washington, DC, tape recording, 5 Aug 1983 (S): OSA History, chap. 5, pp. 1-2 and annex
42 (TS Codeword): Johnson, "Log for Project X," 21 February 1955 .
.Searet

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.