Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also played a part in maintaining…
  • p. 94 …The committee issued its l ist of cargets for the use of the entire intelli gence…
  • p. 147 …The Agency then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C to use the…
  • p. 180 …James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to the maximum degree…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to i llustrate…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional bui ldings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy…
  • p. 348 …Following modifications to make System-VII suitable for use by the Navy, the designation was changed…
  • p. 353 …In 1968 tests on an AQUILINE prototype at Randsburg Wash on the US Navy's Naval…
  • p. 401 …247, 328 US Marine Corps Reserve 14 US Military Academy at West Point 329 US Navy…
43
at 1717 H Street, NW. Here the staff remained for the next six years
until it moved into the new CIA Headquarters building at Langley in
March 1962. The final move came in January 1968, when the project
staff (by that time known as the Office of Special Activities) moved
to the Tyler Building in Tysons Comer, Virginia.1
Bissell reported directly to the DCI, although in reality the
DDCI, Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, was much more closely involved
in the day-to-day affairs of the overhead reconnaissance project.
Cabell's extensive background in Air Force intelligence, particularly
in overhead reconnaissance, made him ideally qualified to oversee the
U-2 project. Cabell frequently attended White House meetings on the
U-2 for the DCI.
FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AOUATONE
Seth!l NOFORN
Chapter 2
Although Allen Dulles had approved the concept of covert funding
for the reconnaissance project, many financial details remained to be
settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless. work on
the U-2 began as soon as the project was authorized. Between 29
November and 3 December 1954, Kelly Johnson pulled together a
team of 25 engineers, which was not easy because he had to take
them off other Lockheed projects without being able to explain why
to their former supervisors. T he engineers immediately began to work
45 hours a week on the project. The project staff gradually expanded
to a total of 8 1 personnel, and the workweek soon increased to 65
hours. 8
DDCI Charles Pearre Cabell
Kelly Johnson's willingness to begin work on the aircraft with
out a contract illustrates one of the most important aspects of this pro
gram: the use of unvouchered funds for covert procurement.
Lockheed was well acquainted with the covert procurement process,
having previously modified several aircraft for covert use by the CI A.
Covert funding for sensiti ve projects sirnpli fies both procure
ment and security procedures because the funds are not attributable to
the Federal Government and there is no public accountabi lity for their
' OSA History. chap. 18. pp. 7-8 (TS Codeword); OSA Chronology. pp. 4. 7. 10. 45 (TS
Codeword).
• Johnson. '"Log for Project X ... 29 November-3 December 1954 (U).
-Sec.et

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.