Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …Dulles The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists…
  • p. 31 …Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …et NOFOAN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …Soviet Union 137 Beacon Hill 17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.! BEACON HILL…
40
Secret 1\101'0~1\1
Chapter 2
James A. Cunningham, Jr.
sat down with a group of key Air Force officials that included Trevor
Gardner and Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt. The participants spent very lit
tle time delineating Air Force and Agency responsibilities in the !Pro
ject, taking for granted that the CIA would handle the secuirity
matters. Much of the discussion centered on methods for diverting
Air Force materiel to the program, particularly the Pratt & Whitney
J57 engines, because a separate contract for the engines might jeop
ardize the project's security. The Air Force promised to tum ov,er a
number of J57 engines, which were then being produced for B-:52s,
KC- l 35s, F-100s, and RB-57s. Eventually Bissell asked who was
going to pay fo r the airframes to be built by Lockheed. His query was
greeted with silence. Everyone present had their eyes on him because
they all expected the Agency to come up with the funds. Bissell rose
from his chair, said he would see what he could do, and the rnee1ting
adjoumed.3
After the meeting. Bissell told Dulles that the CIA would hav,e to
use money from the Contingency Reserve Fund to get the project
going. The DC! used this fu nd to pay for covert activities, following
approval by the President and the Director of the Budget. Dulles 1told
Bissell to draft a memorandum for the President on funding the over
fli ght program and to start putting together a staff for Project
AQUATONE. the project's new codename.
At first the new " Project Staff" (renamed the Development
Projects Staff in April 1958) consisted of Bissell. Miller, and the
small existing staff in Bissel l's Office of the Special Assistant to the
DCI. During the months that followed the establishment of the pro
ject, its administrative workload increased rapidly, and in May 1955
the project staff added an administrative officer, James A.
Cunningham, Jr., a former Marine Corps pilot then working in the
Directorate of Support. Cunningham stayed with the U-2 project for
the next lO years. Two other key project officials who began their du-
~ in 1955 wer~ ] the finance officer, and c==i
L_l the contracting officer."
' OSA History, chap. 3. p. 2 (TS Codeword): Bissell interview, 8 November 1984 (S);
Beschloss, Maydt1y. p. 89.
• OSA History. chap. 3. pp. 6-7. chap. 4, pp. 1-2. chap. 5. pp. 27-29 (TS Codeword);
Chronology of rite Office of Speda/ Activities. 195.J• /968. (CIA: DS&T. 1969). p. 2-4 (TS
Codeword) (hereafter cited as OSA Chronology).

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.