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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

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“Lockheed”60+ pages

  • p. 4 …8 Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA. ........................................ 13 Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance ............................................... 17 The BEACON…
  • p. 6 …260 Competition Between Lockheed and Convair ...................................... 267 The Selection of the Lockheed Design .............. ... ................ ................ 270 Efforts To…
  • p. 12 …excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 (l 983). There has also been…
  • p. 22 …Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the…
  • p. 23 10 Secret ld0F8RN Chapter 1 Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the proposed aircraft…
  • p. 24 …who then asked Lockheed to Kelly Johnson . sμbmit a specific proposal. In early April, Kelly Johnson…
  • p. 25 . 12 Sec,et NOFORN Chapter 1 The Lockheed CL-282 Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General…
  • p. 26 …Despite the Air Force's selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the…
  • p. 27 …Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been re ceived in the Air Staff from Lockheed. Fairchild…
  • p. 28 …range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. :; Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL…
  • p. 29 …Few detaiils about Dulles's precise attitude toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available, but…
  • p. 37 …for Philip Strong of the CIA had told him that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had designed…
  • p. 39 …Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September I954…
  • p. 40 …Council.'A Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 Chapter 1 James R. Killian, Jr…
  • p. 42 …Agency.~·1 Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft soon after he…
  • p. 43 30 Sec, et NOFORM Chapter 1 briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft…
  • p. 44 …During September and October the Project Three study group met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design…
  • p. 47 …The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the reach of…
  • p. 48 …Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar gued that the Bell…
  • p. 49 …He used Gardner's statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the project, which…
  • p. 50 …small group of prominent scientists that the Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais- sance…
  • p. 52 …afternoon of 3 Decembeli, they ' Although the Lockheed CL-282 was not designated as the U…
  • p. 53 …r the airframes to be built by Lockheed. His query was greeted with silence. Everyone present…
  • p. 55 …This category in cluded maintenance and support personnel from Lockheed (five per aircraft), the pilots, and…
  • p. 56 …to be settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless. work on the U-2 began as…
  • p. 57 …A general contractor such as Lockheed can purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed…
  • p. 58 …During the final contract negotiations in the spring of 1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed…
  • p. 59 …Aircraft," 9 Dc:cc:mbc:r 195-i. Lockheed Contract Filc:s. OSA Records (S ). SeeFet
  • p. 61 …F. Boc:hrne. Summary Report: Reconnaissance Aircraft. Lockheed Aircraft Corpor.ition Report I04'.!0. 28 January…
  • p. 63 …1954, even before the CIA adopted the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he would…
  • p. 69 …1-2 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20. Sea,at
  • p. 70 …By July 1955 the base was ready, and Agency, Air Force, and Lockheed personnel began moving…
  • p. 74 61 project-the construction and testing of the aircraft-remained the ex clusive province of Lockheed…
  • p. 77 …The first model of the pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for…
  • p. 79 …Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed CL-282 was going to be known officially as the…
  • p. 81 …former director of Lockheed's Skunk Works. 10 Donald E. Welzenbach, 14 March 1986 (U): Miller…
  • p. 84 …7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22. "' OSA Hiswry, chap. 8, pp. 12-14…
  • p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Area 5 l without arousing a great deal…
  • p. 88 …Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAC pilots who were to be trained by Lockheed…
  • p. 90 …CIA, which then placed an order with Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be…
  • p. 107 …U-2 cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown by the USAF…
  • p. 143 …Lockheed mechanics had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a Lockheed test…
  • p. 144 …Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed tesi: pilot Robert Sieker bailed out but was struck…
  • p. 145 …The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots. as well as the pro totype…
  • p. 157 …As a substitute, Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant qualities, but this…
  • p. 162 …After a series of tests over Edwards AFB, Lockheed began coating the U-2s with a…
  • p. 188 …Although it had been refurbished by Lockheed and now had the more powerful 175 engine that…
  • p. 199 …In the meantime Pow1ers began working for Lockheed as a U-2 pilot. In March 1963…
  • p. 200 …Beschloss claims that Powers was tired by Lockheed for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which…
  • p. 209 …2 One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to up grade six older U…
  • p. 211 …In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that they could be refueled in…
  • p. 220 …story, which was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico…
  • p. 230 …for Detachment C Late in l 958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U…
  • p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
  • p. 236 …U-2 missions, and the Air Force, which had Lockheed P-2V7 and P3A reconnaissance aircraft
  • p. 238 …The planes were maintained by Lockheed mechanics under con tract to the CIA. The Agency attempted…
  • p. 255 …All Air Force and CIA U-2s were or dered back to Lockheed for ultrasonic inspection…
  • p. 260 …The Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan under the cover of Lockheed employees working on a…
  • p. 264 …G in California-with three more at Lockheed undergo ing repair. The Agency had originally ordered…
  • p. 265 …Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who checked out this new aircraft…
37
President and received verbal authorization to proceed. Eisenhower
told Dulles that the project was to be managed by the Agency and
that the Air Force was to provide any assistance needed to get it
operational.66
Thus, it was that the CIA entered into the world of high technol
ogy primarily because of decisions and actions taken outside the
Agency: the Air Force's refusal to build the CL-282 aircraft,
President Eisenhower's desire to have a sensitive overflight project
conducted by a civilian agency rather than the military, and, above all,
the determination by a small group of prominent scientists that the
Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais-
sance system.6,
"" Charles Pearre Cabell, Memorandum for the Record. "Meeting at the White House:·
24 November 1954. in OSA History, chap. 2. annex 8 (TS Codeword) ; Beschloss.
Mayday, pp. 82-83: Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference with the
President, 24 November 1954," White House Office of the Staff Secretary, Alpha Series.
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter cited as WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL) (TS.
declassified).
" Scientists remained active in advising the government on overhead reconnaissance. In
February 1955, the Technological Capabilities Panel issued its final report, which strongly
urged the use of technology to gather intelligence. President Eisenhower strongly backed
the panel's findings and directed government agencies to respond to the recommendations
by June. The CIA's most important reaction to the Technological Capabilities Panel report
was to create its own Scientific Advisory Board composed of the members of the Project
Three Study Group with the addition of James Killian and Jerome B. Wiesner, professor of
electrical engineering at MIT. Edwin Land served as chairman of the CIA Scientific
Advisory Board for the next 10 years, and it soon became known unofficially as the Land
Panel. This panel provided important advice to the Agency, particularly in the field of over
head reconnaissance.
President Eisenhower also acted to increase the amount and quality of scientific advice
he was receiving. In January 1956 he established the President's Board of Consultants on
Foreign Intelligence Activities (renamed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board in 1961) to oversee the intelligence community and advise him on intelligence mat
ters. The board's first chairman was James Killian. In 1957 the President reorganized and
upgraded the Office of Defense Mobilization's Science Advisory Committee, which be
came the President's Science Advisory Committee. He also named James Killian to be the
first Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. In this new position
Killian served as the President's scientific advisor and the chairman of the President's
Scientific Advisory Committee (Killian stepped down as chairman of the President's Board
of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities but remained a member). These actions by
the President brought scientists into the White House and gave them considerable influence.
Sec, et NOi-ORN
Chapter 1
See,et

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.