Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also played a part in maintaining…
  • p. 94 …The committee issued its l ist of cargets for the use of the entire intelli gence…
  • p. 147 …The Agency then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C to use the…
  • p. 180 …James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to the maximum degree…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to i llustrate…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional bui ldings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy…
  • p. 348 …Following modifications to make System-VII suitable for use by the Navy, the designation was changed…
  • p. 353 …In 1968 tests on an AQUILINE prototype at Randsburg Wash on the US Navy's Naval…
  • p. 401 …247, 328 US Marine Corps Reserve 14 US Military Academy at West Point 329 US Navy…
36
Sec, et NOP'ORl\1
Chapter 1
On 19 November, the day after Seaberg's briefing, the final deci
sion on the CL-282 came at a luncheon hosted by Air Force Secretary
Talbott. The participants-Dulles and Cabell from the CIA; Gardner,
Ayer, and General Putt from the Air Force; Kelly Johnson; and Edwin
Land-all agreed "that the special item of material described by
Lockheed was practical and desirable and would be sought. ... It was
agreed that the Project should be a joint Air Force-CIA one but that,
regardless of the source of the funds, whether AF or CIA. CIA
unvouchered channels would be needed to pass the funds.,,,,.,
It is interesting to note that Lockheed, which had originally de
veloped the CL-282 on its own and had devoted considerable effort to
promoting it, had to be persuaded to undertake the project in
November 1954 because the company had become heavily committed
to several other civilian and military projects. When Kelly Johnson
received a call from Trevor Gardner on l 7 November asking him to
come to Washington for conversations on the project, his instructions
from Lockheed's senior management were ''to not commit to any
program during the visit, but to get the information and return."
When he returned to California, Johnson noted in his project log that
"I was impressed with the secrecy aspect and was told by Gardner
that I was essentially being drafted for the project. It seemed, in fact,
that if I did not talk quietly, I might have to take a leave of absence
from my job at Lockheed to do this special project." 05 Of course,
Kelly Johnson did not need to be drafted or persuaded into undertak
ing such a bold step forward in aircraft design. He used Gardner's
statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the
project, which they did after meeting with Johnson when he returned
to California on the evening of I 9 November.
Four days later, on 23 November, the Intelligence Advisory
Committee (IAC) approved DCI Dulles's request to undertake the
CL-282 project. The following day Dulles signed a three-page mem
orandum, drafted by DDCI Cabell. asking President Eisenhower to
approve the overhead reconnaissance project. That same afternoon, at
a meeting attended by the Secretaries of State and Defense and senior
Air Force officials. Dulles and Cabell presented the document to the
"" Charles Pearre Cabell, Memorandum for the Record...Luncheon Meeting with the
Secretary of the Air Force,.. 19 November 1954. in OSA History. chap. 2, annex 4 (TS
Codeword).
"" Johnson, "Log for Project X," 17 and 19 :-.:ovember 1954.
6eerati

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.